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CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Relationships of Sub-Saharan African Societies, Islam Examined
(Guy Nicolas; LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, Apr-May 80) 1

Gambia, Mauritania Sign Friendship, Cooperation Treaty
(THE GAMBIA NEWS BULLETIN, 30 Aug 80) 17

Briefs
Cape Verde-Sao Tome Cooperation 19

ANGOLA

FAPLA, South African, UNITA War Activities Detailed
(J. Branquinho; NOTICIAS, 17, 24, 27 Aug 80) 20

Potential of Existing, New Oil Discoveries Surveyed
(EUROPE OUTREMER, Apr 80) 34

CAPE VERDE

Pires: Fundamentals of Foreign Policy Are Immutable
(Pedro Pires; VOZ DE POVO, 9 Aug 80) 36

Briefs
Foreign Minister to Brazil 38
Trade Union Delegation Returns 38

CHAD

Ousman Gam Discusses Prospects for Solution to Conflict
(Albert S. Mianzoukouta; LA SEMAINE AFRICAINE, 21-27 Aug 80) 39

Armored Bulldozers Used in War
(LE SOLEIL, 22 Aug 80) 42

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Survey of Political, Economic Conditions One Year After Coup
(Pierre Biarnes; LE MONDE, 20 Aug 80) 43

GABON

Bongo Worried by Consequences of Oil Price Increases
(AFP, 18 Sep 80) 47

New Oil Finds Promise Increased Yield
(EUROPE OUTREMER, Apr 80) 48

GHANA

Nkrumaists Congratulate Toure on Failed Assassination Attempt
(HOROYA, 28 Aug 80) 50

GUINEA

Women Centers Receive North Korean Embroidery Training
(Amirou Barry; HOROYA, 17-18 Aug 80) 52

Briefs
Saudi Arabian Road Construction Loan 53
Economic Agreement With PRC 53

KENYA

Firm Cited as Example of Aid to National Economy
(Editorial; TAIFA LEO, 11 Sep 80) 54

MALI

Traore Interviewed on Forthcoming Party Congress
(Bamako Domestic Service, 19 Sep 80) 56

MAURITIUS

MMM Has Rejected Stalinism
(Paul Berenger Interview; LE MAURICIEN, 28 Jul 80) 58

Additional Discussion of Changes in MMM Political Ideology
(LE MAURICIEN, 8 Aug 80) 65

Issue of Rodrigues Secession Discussed
(LE MAURICIEN, 22 Aug 80) 72

PSM Leader Challenges Prime Minister
(THE NATION, 11 Aug 80) 75

Five Cities To Hold Municipal Elections
(THE NATION, 9 Aug 80) 76

MOZAMBIQUE

Reader Complains About Services Inefficiency After Independence
(Joaquim Luis Madeira; TEMPO, 24 Aug 80) 77
77

Vacationing Students From Cuba Deplore Lack of Contact
(Rogerio Sitol, Francisco Sinela;
NOTICIAS, 9 Aug 80) 79

General Staff Chief on Military Operations, Maneuvers
(Sebastiao Marcos Mabote Interview;
TEMPO, 24 Aug 80) 81

Newly-Established Chamber of Commerce Goals Detailed
(NOTICIAS, 9 Aug 80) 86

Production Difficulties Hinder Limpopo Complex
(NOTICIAS, 3 Aug 80) 88

Agricultural Cooperatives Department Found Deficient
(Antonio Matonse; NOTICIAS, 13 Aug 80) 89

Briefs
GDR Youth Brigade 91
Prizes for Best Workers 91

NAMIBIA

Briefs
Soviet Weapons 92

SENEGAL

Measures Regulating Number, Pay of Civil Servants
(Abdallah Faye; LE SOLEIL, 22 Aug 80) 93

Strict Implementation of Civil Service Measures Essential
(Cherif Elvalide Seye; LE SOLEIL,
22 Aug 80) 95

TANZANIA

Reasons for Increase in Tazara Rates Set Forth
(Editorial; UHURU, 12 Sep 80) 96

Briefs
Hungary's Losonczi Visits Park 98

ZIMBABWE

Mugabe Backs Freedom Fighters in Assembly Camps
(Salisbury Domestic Service, 18 Sep 80) 99

Briefs
Mugabe Rejects Military Airfields 100

RELATIONSHIPS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN SOCIETIES, ISLAM EXAMINED

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Apr-May 80 pp 47-64

[Article by Guy Nicolas: "African Societies, Arab World and Islamic Culture"]

[Text] The present study is the introductory lecture for the series of lectures presented on the subject concerned in February-March 1979 by the Center for Studies on Relations between the Arab World and Africa (INALCO).

The domain of the interactions between Islamic culture, the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa holds an increasingly decisive position in the contemporary world, and more particularly, for the future of Africa. But it has not so far received as much attention as other questions. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to keep track of the flow of information relating to so vast and complex a movement. The time is past when a single person could hope to master the existing documentation. The precipitation of events, the flow of data, the development of research, the multiplication of publications and their increasing diffusion impose the absolute necessity of promoting the circulation of information, encouraging the cooperation of specialists and organizing coherent research. It is important to determine the strong points of our knowledge and the gaps to be filled in and to stimulate the interest of young researchers. On the other hand, overall analysis of the question under consideration--too often treated in the form of a juxtaposition of partial work, without any organic links among it--should be encouraged.

In the third place, most of the available studies concerning the problem at hand date from the period that preceded the independence of the modern African states and therefore do not concern the present developments in this field. But these developments are rapid and considerable: Afro-Arab relations, sub-Saharan Islam and the Moslem question have taken new turns. New frameworks have appeared. Furthermore, a great deal of research and published works are being developed today in the Arab and African universities and universities in other parts of the world, and some of this calls the conclusions of previous authors into question. It is important to take these trends into consideration and analyze them.

We have given this study the title "African Societies, Arab World and Islamic Culture." It seemed necessary to us to distinguish the three levels of sociocultural reality that it evokes. It is a question of analyzing the processes of complex interaction among areas that do happen to mix together but that also dissociate and function at different levels. Very often, the Moslem universe is reduced by observers to its Arab "home" and a fringe of it. Such a point of view makes for neglect of certain manifestations of Islamic reality that do not relate to the Arab universe, and thus misunderstanding of a part of the richness and diversity of the Moslem cultures as a whole. In particular, Islam gets treated as an aspect of Arab culture as such, so that the expansion of Islam comes to be considered a process of Arabization pure and simple. On the other hand, the specific local characteristics of many non-Arab societies that have adopted Islam are considered somewhat as effects of an incomplete grafting of Arab culture onto stocks that are fundamentally foreign to it. This point of view leads to considering that the groups concern may never be able to conform to the pure Islamic model because of the fact of their origin, unless they make a total conversion to Arabness.

Such a perspective is sometimes applied more particularly to the Islamized societies south of the Sahara. The disparity between the local popular practices and the Arab model is then perceived as a sort of deterioration of Islamic purity, as if there were authentic Moslem peoples on the one hand, and on the other, second-rank Moslem peoples corresponding to the periphery of the Arab world, and more particularly, its southern or "Negro" edges. Such points of view underlie prejudices, strategies, contempts and ways of envisaging the relations among Moslems, and more or less lively reactions from those who thus find themselves relegated to the fringes. This is why they need to be analyzed with the greatest objectivity and the greatest clarity. In particular, we must study the way in which African societies that are rooted in a long and complex history and whose orientations are often far-removed from those of the other Moslem societies respond to the Islamic model as such, as well as to the presence of their Arab partners and coreligionists.

Historical Problems

The first aspect of the question of the relations among African societies, Arab world and Islamic culture relates to the plane of history. Indeed, contrary to other sub-Saharan societies which because of the absence of written documents on their past have been classified as "societies without history," the Moslem societies of this region have been the subject of written descriptions, often ancient ones. It is perhaps in the domain of history that sub-Saharan Islam is best known, although a large part of the local writings have not yet given up their secrets. However, the sources on which this history has been built are sometimes challenged today, from the point of view both of their objectivity and of the value of the observations or documents available to their authors or the scope of their descriptions. In addition, the gap that has so far been maintained between historians and collectors of oral or ethnographic traditions has not facil-

itated the efforts at reconstruction of the past of the societies concerned. The concepts or models used by the first historians are likewise disputed or judged to be marked by ethnocentric, racial or ideological prejudices. Various contemporary researchers also demonstrate a concept of history that puts the emphasis on military exploits or the positions of the aristocracy, to the detriment of other more fundamental aspects of economic, social and cultural life.

The distorting character of historical reconstructions based on foreign narratives or those of a particular social category--that is, the literate, whose observations could well be influenced by their own group ideologies or values--has also been stressed. Certain historians have also been reproached for having devalued precolonial Islam, by depreciating its relations with the rest of the Moslem world and its most brillian manifestations. The authors of these criticisms stress the ancientness of the relations between the Moslem societies of the two sides of the Sahara and of the Red Sea, their permancence through the centuries, and the fact that certain literate Africans of the past attained a high degree of mastery of the two cultures, Arab and African, at the same time. The authors of the beginning of this century appear to have exaggerated the isolation and specificity of sub-Saharan Islam and its heterodox aspects.

As regards the fact that certain literate persons in the past possessed both cultures, it could prove that the encounter of the Arab and African cultures does not necessarily result in syncretic compromises, but that it can produce harmonious relationships, based on based on possession of two cultures, in the same way that is the portion of many contemporary Africans as regards Western culture. This fact, which needs to be analyzed, opens up some interesting perspectives with regard to the destinies of Islam south of the Sahara.

As regards the studies, the approach to the "Moslem question" in this region has taken a sinuous course. At the beginning of European penetration, the conquerors ran up against large hostile Moslem groups or movements that raised the standard of "holy war" against them. During the period of implantation of the European colonial regime, the administrators stood in fear of the outbreak of insurrection movements of Moslem inspiration. In this context, analyses of the sub-Saharan Moslem phenomenon, done mostly by European administrators, multiplied. But as local Islam gradually lost most of its political dimensions and the Moslem cadres were integrated into the colonial apparatus, the studies becames rarer, except as regarded the more distant past. Most of the researchers then turned toward study of the non-Moslem cultures. In the era of national independence, sub-Saharan Islam was no longer in the forefront of immediate concern. It was considered mainly from the angle of religion. The new African elites, a large part of whom came out of the mission schools or the public schools, turned toward outlooks according to which Islam, an imported religion, was to play only a minor role in the development of modern Africa.

Since then, various events have again drawn the attention of the specialists and of innumerable commentators. Studies of importance and of very unequal value have multiplied. It is important to apply a more rigorous method of analysis to the processes in question, so as to get out of the realm of stereotypes or prejudices and arrive at more precise, more objective and more comprehensive knowledge of the facts under consideration.

Islam and Ethnicity

Another dimension of sub-Sahara Islam of which analysis should be developed is its ethnic roots. In the first place, indeed, the expansion of Islam south of the Sahara has often followed the course of ethnic affiliation. Reciprocally, the ethnic divisions have frequently been expressed by religious affiliations, with the groups neighboring the often hegemonistic Islamized societies refusing to adopt the new religion from reaction against the conquering and assimilating posture of these societies, or because the religion of these foreigners, linked to their own ethnic character, was involved. Because of this situation, the religious map of certain regions of Africa--especially in the Sudan zone--often coincided, up to a recent date, with that of the ethnic frontiers. Moreover, among the ethnic groups that have gone over to Islam, there are some who identify more closely with it. These particular groups consider their own practices as an ideal model, despite their specific aspects related to the influence of their ancestral customs. These claims are based on historical events, especially the ancientness of the Islamization of the population in question in relation to that of its neighbors, participation in a past Moslem empire, or the more or less decisive role played by the society in question in propagation of the Islamic model, within the framework of a "holy war" movement in particular. Likewise, it has happened that different ethnic groups have opposed one another on the basis of memberships in different brotherhoods.

The members of the societies in question identify their ethnic membership with a more rigorous practice of Islam and consider themselves, or are considered by others, as more authentic Moslems. This privileged status has sometimes fallen to the Arabs. But other autochthonous groups lay claim to it and challenge the superiority of the Prophet's race. Among these groups there figure in particular the Sarakole, the Tukulor, the Malinke, the Dyula, the Wolof (since recently), the Hausa, the Somalis, the Afro-Shirazi, the Nyamwezi, the Yao. In this case, the ethnic particularisms are reinforced by awareness of a superiority in the matter of religion, which takes over from declining traditions. This phenomenon has a certain importance among the diaspora abroad, especially as regards the relations of African and Arab emigres, but also the organization of the emigre colonies and their divisions. These partitions in function of ethnic framework can impede the establishment of a unified and cohesive Moslem community. They impair the application of Islamic universalism and work against the constitution of an Islamic nation.

In the second place, the ethnic roots of the religious phenomenon often resulted, at the time of European colonization and on the occasion of de-

colonization, in situations of ethnic and regional disequilibrium that thwarted the efforts by the leaders of these states to set up national entities around them. In certain countries, indeed, the borders between ethnic groups coincided with those of societies with old antagonisms or zones of unequal development, on the one hand, and on the other, with between groups holding a monopoly of power and dominated groups. These situations, sometimes originally created and maintained by the various colonizers, were reinforced by the fact of development of the Christian missionaries' action in the un-Islamized zones. In particular, whereas the Moslems turned in on their traditions and closed themselves off against Western schooling, the mission schools trained a new elite open to the modern world. By this fact, the Christianized--or at least un-Islamized--people have been able to monopolize power, with the Moslems finding themselves elbowed out of the state because of their lack of Western training.

The measures taken by the new leadership elites against the structure of the Moslem societies considered conservative or "feudal" or against the Moslem cadres have then often been perceived by the Islamized populations as attacks against their values and themselves. This has often resulted in mobilization of the Moslems and often violent conflicts that have in fact owed less to the differences in religious orientations than to ancient ethnic or regional antagonisms than to economic or political situations of a completely different kind.

Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the scope of the ethnic roots of sub-Saharan Islam. First of all, we are far from having precise knowledge of the realities to which the concept of "ethnic group" corresponds, as well as those of people, culture, society or nationality. These realities are more elusive and complex than has been believed by observers anxious to find on African soil frameworks identical to those of their societies of origin. May ethnographers appear to have exaggerated the self-containment and coherence of ethnic groups. They have not seen that many of these groups shared a common sociocultural foundation more important, sometimes, than their disparities and forming vast regional wholes, such as the Sudanese bloc, the eastern bloc, the forest bloc, etc. In addition, a large n umber of the ethnic groups have never had political unity. Most of them are heterogeneous. Finally, many have been divided in the past into rival, often pluriethnic, political formations.

By breaking the political frameworks that could impede their installing themselves and by establishing the local political dynamic, the various colonizers put in jeopardy a fundamental dimension of previous African social life. In this brand-new situation, the ethnic framework took on a dimension and importance that it often had never had up to then--all the more so in that the colonial administrations tried to build their governing framework partly on the basis of it.

To view things from another angle, adherence to Islam has always presented a universalist outlook whose effect was to break down the ethnic barriers. The great Moslem political groups of the past, and more particularly the

processes of "holy war" that the Africa of the Sudan experienced, have favored the mixing of populations of different ethnic origin and partly substituted the religious criterion for that of ethnic traditions. In addition, a continuous process of Islamization has constantly been exerted in originally non-Moslem groups, since the beginning of European penetration. This process tends to break down the old ethnic frontiers referred to above, from the point of view of religious affiliation. This process is constantly being amplified, notably within the framework of the great contemporary migration processes. In other regions, the concurrent penetration of Islam and Christianity has favored the partitioning of the same ethnic groups into distinct religious parties. Finally, in our day, the ethnic phenomenon--the national-leaning manifestations of which disturb the local leaders, who are quick to consider such manifestations as so many centrifugal "tribal" forces, especially when they are exhibited by grups other than those on which they base their support--is tending to lose its importance. Things stand this way especially because of the fact of the evolution of the younger generations, the policies of "national construction," the suspicion of which it is the object, the intervention of new ideologies or the effect of the new socioeconomic and political frameworks, as well as the increasing mobility of the populations.

The situations are far from being fixed, however, and in certain circumstances--especially when expression of political differences is impossible on other levels--the ethnic framework can assert unexpected political reactions, within the framework of which various particularisms play the role of mobilizing symbols. It happens also that devotion to ethnic particularism, deprived of its traditional bases, takes refuge in certain practices, which are thus promoted to the role of symbols of collective identity. Here, religious affiliation can play a surrogate role, to the extent to which religious references are less suspect than ethnic references as such, where there exists a coherent and influential religious organizational framework and where Islam appears as a model both traditional and modern at the same time. Here again, analysis of these processes cannot be considered over and done with.

Confraternal and Sectarian Frameworks

Another essential sociological framework of sub-Saharan Islam is constituted by the different "ways" or brotherhoods of Sufi inspiration. These great mystic orders have contributed powerfully to the expansion of this vision of the world in this region. They have molded the local beliefs and practices and have provided the Islamized populations with an organizational framework that is often very dense. It is possible that they found propitious ground south of the Sahara, that their mystical dimension, or at least certain aspects of their doctrines, harmonizes with the local sensitivity and initiatory tradition. Their role in the spreading of Islam could be partly explained in this way. However, an exhaustive treatment of this question can be done only within the framework of consideration of all the manifestations of popular Sufism in the Moslem world in its totality, making it possible to distinguish what is truly specific to African reality from what is not.

Furthermore, various local deviations from the Sufi mystical ideal have been stressed. In fact, the behavior of many adepts of these "ways" is very far-removed from the quest of the saints of Islam who aimed at a fusion with God. One cannot, however, systematize these deviations without examination and deny the existence of a pure mystical dimension for which the brotherhoods are the chosen medium, even if this dimension is taken on only by a minority. This minority has been able to exist only because of the existence of a favorable milieu. Besides, the cohesion of the brotherhoods has often been exaggerated. Very often, whereas a few masters live and know their doctrines, most of those who follow them are ignorant of nearly all of them and rely on the former to connect them to the Creator. This surrender is perceived as the principal implication of their adherence. Because of this fact, the brotherhoods can control a sizable part of the local Moslem populations without this control's necessarily corresponding to an an extension of mysticism as such; thus, one can belong to a birth brotherhood, by the fact that the "marabout" to whom one entrusts oneself belongs to it or because one "way" or another is reputed to be more efficient in this world and in the other.

The local branches of different Moslem brotherhoods have on occasion engaged in furious competition. This has sometimes taken the form of fratricidal struggles between adepts of Islam. They pit the ethnic groups against one another, they help break up the political groupings and families and divide the Moslem collectivities into factions whose allegiance goes beyond the regional or continental framework. They have thus favored the existence of separations into distinct blocs, based on networks of clientage between masters and disciples, natives and foreigners. It seems, however, that data collected in certain regions where the brotherhoods have particular characteristics not always encountered elsewhere have been wrongly extended to the whole of the Moslem populations south of the Sahara. Thus it is that the brotherhood phenomenon has sometimes been somewhat imprudently equated with its Senegalese manifestations, linked to purely local specificities. Likewise, it would be erroneous to extend to the whole of East Africa--where the brotherhoods seem more numerous, more divided, more closed-in on themselves--observations collected in the Sudanese zone, where orders such as the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya have more cohesiveness, and vice-versa.

The same observations can hold true for the sects of Shiite or Ahmadi inspiration imported from India or Pakistan, mainly, by "Asiatic" immigrants within the territories of the Commonwealth. However, these sects are for the most part organized and administered by foreign missionaries and have specific structures, different from those of the Sufi "ways," which are profoundly integrated into the African milieu and are largely independent of their outside home-bases.

However, study of the brotherhood and sectarian frameworks of Africa south of the Sahara has still not been developed very much, outside of certain regions--such as Senegal, already mentioned--or certain of these frameworks. Or rather, the analyses done do not establish connections between

the brotherhood or sectarian phenomenon and its local economic, social or political underpinnings. The changes of orientation that an order can manifest and brotherhood conversions are areas about which little is known. Likewise, there is ignorance of the scope of the international relations among members of the same order.

Islam and the State

Another dimension--a decisive one--of the relations among Islamic culture, the Arab world and African societies has developed since the period of birth of the new African states. Since that time, these relationships have existed partly within the new political frameworks in question. Because of this fact, the "Moslem question" has aspects today that it did not have until then. And the work done before independence is often of little help to us today for analysis of the present situations. In the first place, it is impossible to consider the question raised without referring it to the "national construction" policies of the local states or if one ignores the modern political aspects of the Moslem problem. The see-saw has tipped in the opposite direction in the field that we are considering.

Centrifugal, secessionist, controversial effects, expressed in the development of local political conflicts, are frequently attributed to Islam. When such conflicts involve adepts of different cults, no matter what the basic causes may be, there is always a commentator who evokes a resumption of "holy war," or at least a "war of religion." Such commentaries, however, need to be examined with the strictest rigor, and the analyses that support them need to be emptied of the confusions that burden them. This is a considerable task for those who take it on themselves to account for the Moslem phenomenon in this region. Furthermore, all the sub-Saharan states are developing their relations with different Arab countries today. Reciprocally, various Arab states are intervening in local affairs more and more frequently and profoundly. Such interventions have multiplied, as we know, since the "oil war"--a period when most of the African governments, threatened by the economic crisis and finding themselves partly deprived of their Western support, the West being also at grips with the crisis, appealed to the Arab producers in the name of Third World solidarity. The latter responded to these requests in a more or less massive fashion, and thus found themselves with a foothold in a region that had been of relatively little interest to them until then, except within the framework of the struggle being carried on against the influence of Israel in many states of the Sahara, including some states with Moslem majorities. This latest offensive, whose stakes in the international milieus were considerable, has generally been crowned with success.

The Arab activities are in different areas: they involve economic aid, bilateral or through umbrella organizations; creation of joint Afro-Arab organisms; development of the Arab diplomatic presence; extensive cultural action; political and sometimes military interventions. In this context, the Arab financial backers are using their new positions to favor the expansion of Islam and the reform of local practices in the direction of

closer association between them and the Arab model. They are helping the local Moslem collectivities. They are offering mosques that enhance their positions, educational establishments, and are sending teachers and educators. They are also training new African Moslem cadres in their universities and are encouraging the action of Moslem notables, as well as of the new reformist elites, in certain cases.

Islamic Reformism

There have already existed, since the time of European colonization, movements for reform of African Islam, militating in favor of diffusion of the Arab language, purification of the teaching of Islamic theology or law, and the establishment of modern educational institutions, and against the influence of the traditional Moslem cadres, considered corrupt, ignorant, and compromised with the colonizers. However, the movements were at the time generally limited to certain milieus very much in the minority. Their financial means were small, as was their freedom of action. Their outside support was weak, and drew upon them suspicions of an administration anxious to wipe out the influence of Arab nationalism south of the Sahara. Thus their influence was small. Since the "oil war," the support granted by different Arab countries to the local reformist milieus has been increasing. Today, thousands of Arab cooperation personnel are providing them with effective support. Thousands of new cadres are being trained in the Arab universities. A whole new infrastructure, offered by the oil countries, is made available to them. The reformers are also benefiting from the support of the Arab states that are sponsoring them, and the leaders of their countries have to take account of this support, which is connected with other forms of cooperation. In addition, the new Moslem elites are benefiting from the prestige of the Arab countries and are getting a new hearing from a part of the young people who are disillusioned by Westernization or the evolution of the local regimes, or are excluded from power. In the eyes of these younger generations, Islam no longer appears--as it often did in the era preceding independence--as a conservative tradition that was wasting away or outmoded, or an instrument in the hands of foreign powers. It has become a model of modernity, offering an acceptable middle way between a customary system no longer answering contemporary needs and an impossible or rejected Westernization.

However, this reformist current is running up against strong resistance from the popular Moslem milieus, and especially from the traditional religious cadres, whose influence and prestige have remained very great within them, generally speaking. These notables, challenged by their adversaries, are reacting to their attacks by a rejection that limits the interferences between the two movements for the expansion of Islam, the traditional and the modern. Furthermore, these worthies are supported by various "moderate" Arab states or leaders who are counting on their position and consider it more strategic to use their intermediary position to advance the cause of Islam in accordance with their views. In another quarter, a part of the Westernized Moslem elites south of the Sahara are adhering to the pan-African or "black," even "nationalist" currents, which are causing an "in-

sular" reaction of retreat in the face of the pan-Islamic or pan-Arab current. The proponents of this second modern current consider themselves both orthodox Moslems and authentic Africans. They challenge the Arab leadership, in whom they see a manifestation of foreign and "white" political and cultural "imperialism." This position leads them in particular to dispute the Arab or local stories which in their view accords an exaggerated position to the extra-African or "Hamitic" influences lying at the origin of local Islam or of certain of its manifestations, constituting an alienating attack against African identity. This reaction is nourished by that of a part of the modern African elites, Moslem or not, who are very sensitive to what is considered the expansionist tendency of certain Arab countries or parties, as well as to the condescending attitudes of many Moslems of the outside vis-a-vis their coreligionists of Black Africa. It encounters an analogous sensitivity on the part of students or emigre workers in contact with Arab milieus within which they denounce a certain attitude of contempt toward them, connected with the fact that they are "blacks," which in certain Arab countries is equated with being a slave or a member of an inferior caste.

These attitudes are to be analyzed with their economic, political, social and cultural context taken into account. There is a vast field of study here, the approach to which is particularly delicate, because of the fact of the political and psychological character of the problem; but its importance cannot be denied from the point of view of the practice and position of the sub-Saharan Moslems.

It will be recalled, though, that the Arab countries are not the only Moslem countries that do proselytizing activity in favor of Islam in this region. Other states, especially India and Pakistan, have played an important role in the expansion of Islam and its reform, either as states or through the intermediary of their nationals. This has been the case notably in the African countries formerly colonized by the British Empire. We have already referred to the role of the various Shiite and Ahmadi sects among the young African elites of East Africa, in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone. The influence of these foreigners, who are often reticent as regards any Arab hegemonic pretensions in matters of Islam, is strengthening the "insular" dispositions already mentioned in the direction of emphasis on the linguistic particularisms or the specificity of local practices. The events presently taking place in Iran and Pakistan are arousing lively interest among the new Moslem elites, especially in Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania. Within this framework there is being developed a solidarity of the Moslem periphery that is strengthening a certain falling-back on the local identities.

The fact should be mentioned, though, that Arab-African cooperation or cooperation between eastern and sub-Saharan Moslem countries is not a one-way matter. In addition to the support given to the Arab countries by most of the African states within the international bodies, certain of them, or the OAU, are taking action within the Arab world more and more frequently. Thus, for example, Sudan has been participating up to this time in the Arab

intervention force in Lebanon and belongs to the Arab League, as do Somalia and Djibouti. Likewise, President Amin Dada had an attitude favorable to the Palestinian cause, and several African countries are participating in the settlement of the Western Sahara question. But one cannot isolate the field of the Moslem world's internal relations or relations between Arab and African countries from international relations as a whole--in particular, from the relations between Western culture and African cultures, from the impact of the great modern ideologies and from the interventions of various world powers in the African continent, as well as in the Moslem world. Nor can the study of sub-Saharan Islam be isolated either, as might have been possible in a different situation.

Arabic Language and African Languages

We have just made mention of a number of fields to which a certain amount of attention has been devoted by reasearchers. But there are other sectors into which they have ventured very little, even though they constitute an important part of the reality of the relations among African societies, the Arab world and Islamic culture. Let us cite first of all the field of linguistic relations, and more particularly, the African languages' borrowings from Arabic, the evolution of languages of a syncretic character, and the confrontation of the Arabic languages and the indigenous languages.

This particular field, which shows very profound cultural interrelations, is undergoing great changes today, because of the policy of diffusion of the Arabic language being conducted by the Arab states and the reformist milieus already referred to and the reactions that this policy is triggering among the populations concerned. In effect, the diffusion of Islam in a large part of the African continent is not being accompanied by diffusion of the language of the Koran. Even the great movements of Islamic reform or of "holy war" in the past did not impose this language, whereas they did sometimes contribute to the expansion of other African languages, such as Fulani, Mandingo, Hausa or Swahili. The major part of the Moslem texts of Africa south of the Sahara are written with Arabic characters but in local languages. This situation constitutes an important cultural event, which furthermore is not unique to Africa and the approach to which lies through the approach to Islamic culture as a whole. But while the linguistic borrowings take place only at certain levels, the same has not been the case with Arabic script, as well as with Arab-Islamic literature. These latter have been integrated into the local traditions. The borrowings constitute an important factor of cultural mutation. On the one hand, in effect, most of the IslamizedAfrican societies have elaborated a non-Arab Moslem literature. This situation has taken the form notably of the development of a class of bilingual literate people, in a position as intermediaries between their societies and the rest of the Islamic world. As we have seen, certain of these literate people have for centuries possessed a double culture, Arab and African.

On the other hand, the transfer into the African languages and cultures of social, moral and cultural models carried by Arabic literature and taught

to generations of children for centuries has introduced numerous changes into the local mores. This input, which remains to be evaluated, should not be underestimated. The attachment of the sub-Saharan Moslems to their ancestral languages poses a crucial problem in the matter of cultural and religious interaction. Most Moslem theologians consider, in effect, that the language in which the Koran was revealed has a sacred character and should be intimately linked to the diffusion of Islam. On this level, Arabization should go hand in hand with Islamization. And the African reformists are militating for the teaching of the Arabic language. A sizable part of Arab assistance is connected with this area. Adoption of the Arabic language is perceived as a first step toward a more authentic Islam and therefore toward integration of that religion's local adepts into the Islamic community. This posture assigns a decisive position to the Arabizing teachers, as against the notables considered "ignorant."

However, the broad masses of the sub-Saharan Moslems pit against this policy of linguistic conversion an indefectible attachment to their own ethnic languages, to which they persist in connecting their religion. This reaction has been especially marked in Somalia, where the leaders have resisted Saudi Arabia's explicit pressures to get them to adopt Arabic as the official language in place of Somali, even though their country belongs to the Arab League. This reaction is also encountered in southern Mauritania, in Chad, in Tanzania, and especially in Zanzibar, where Swahili was deliberately substituted for Arabic as the official language at the time of independence. This type of collective reaction, which reinforces the ethnic or "African" particularisms, as well as the position of the traditional religious notables, impedes the process of uniformization of religious practices, from the point of view of more total conversion to the Arab model. In some instances it helps to reinforce the local "national constructions," which are threatened by the emergence of an "Islamic nation" or whose promoters base their support on the traditional religious cadres and the young nationalist elites.

The Juridical Impact of Islam

Another impact--perhaps a more decisive one--of Islamic culture south of the Sahara concerns the juridical domain. On the one hand, the influence of the Moslem jurists has expanded into all the Islamized populations, in different degrees, and not without overturning many customs, especially those that were connected with the matrilinear system. On the other hand, the Moslems tend to demand application of the "shari'a," or Islamic law, and to reject the laws of judicial institutions of Western inspiration, on which the constitutions of most of the African states are based. On the former level, the adoption of the norms decreed by the great Sunni jurists has been accompanied by some accomodation with the ancestral traditions. Here too, the Moslem reformists run up against some tenacious resistance. On the second level, a sort of spontaneous division has often occurred within the African states that have a large proportion of Moslems: according to these tacit agreements, the state reserves certain juridical areas to itself, but surrenders to the Moslem judges a sector of law that thus

escapes its jurisdiction and remains administered by the Moslem community, which in a way is thus constituted, at this level, as a state within a state, indeed a "counter-government." Entire sections of the law relating to persons and to goods are thus taken out of the ordinary law and constitute reserved areas that escape its control.

In most cases, the leaders close their eyes to the existence of these ghettoes of a particular type. In other cases, constitutional provisions regulate the relations of these two jurisdictions, authorizing their coexistence. In certain countries, though, strive to impose their law as the official law and affect to subject the non-Moslems to it. At the very least, the latter fear having to be subject to laws based on criteria to which they do not subscribe, and they consider this tendency a manifestation of unacceptable hegemonism. Elsewhere, the Moslem minorities reject the official law and demand for themselves the application of Islamic law only. This demand is rejected by the upholders of a national unity based on the existence of a single law. These juridical conflicts often have ethnic or political roots whose interference obscures discussion. Such conflicts have played an important role in certain countries, notably in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and recently Nigeria. They are complicated by the dissension among the supporters of different juridical schools trying to impose their own norms on their coreligionists, even though there is regional partitioning among the four principal Sunni juridical schools south of the Sahara.

With this problem of the influence of Moslem law is connected the question of the Arab or Islamic model of the state and of many institutions considered to be of Mediterranean or Western origin. According to certain authors, the diffusion of these structures is to be credited to Islam. This thesis is strongly contested by other researchers, who stress the existence of structures of the same type before Islam and dispute the idea of an outside influence fertilizing the African ground, saying that it only expresses the imperialist ideology of those authors. This question is not only of interest from the point of view of understanding of past history. The political systems worked out by certain modern Arab states inspires a part of the sub-Saharan Moslem elites for whom these models are better-suited to the local realities than are those of Western or other inspiration. Therefore, these debates are not purely academic ones. Analysis of them should make possible a better understanding of various contemporary processes, including the conversion of African leaders, certain local conflicts, and the impact on the Moslem masses as a whole, beyond the frontiers, of the demands of the Moslems of certain countries.

Another area in which the influence of the Arab and Islamic cultures on the African cultures seems to have been important and which nevertheless has been studied little is that of technologies and arts. On the level of technologies, Islamization has been accompanied by the diffusion of such practices as a new military art, a different architecture, a particular type of clothing. However, it is difficult to discern the share of Islam in these contributions, as distinguished from that of the Mediterrarean or

Eastern cultures. In addition, certain of these cultures could in fact be of indigenous origin. Such, at least, is a thesis that is frequently maintained today and that cannot be rejected without examination. Another technique connected with the expansion of Islam is that of the market. It is generally the Moslems who have developed this institution south of the Sahara. In several regions, trade has been to date a monopoly of the adepts of Islam and is recognized as such by the "pagan" populations. In our day, the merchant is still frequently a Moslem, and development of the market goes hand in hand with that of the Islamic religion, which it favors.

As regards art, the iconoclastic effect of Islam and its negative impact on "Negro art" has been stressed. Wherever the Islamic religion is established, the masks, the representations of supernatural powers and "Negro" symbolization have disappeared. On the other hand, Islam's contributions in art, architecture, dress, ornamentation, weaponry, literature and calligraphy have not always been duly appreciated. These are areas in which the confrontation of the two cultures, Arab and African, has produced profound changes of outlook. But study of these changes has scarcely been developed to date.

Confrontations of Cultures

More than any of the partial areas that we have mentioned, though, the fact that strikes anyone who devotes himself to analysis of Arab-African relations and to the expansion of the Islamic model is the overall phenomenon constituted by the confrontation of two visions of the world. This phenomenon can be viewed from the angle of a confrontation between opposed or at least divergent outlooks on the destiny of man as well as from the point of view of the upheavals resulting from propagation of the Islamic system in the daily life of the populations who have subscribed to it. For it is impossible to isolate the religious aspect as such of a world view such as that of Islam or of the African tradition from their economic, social or political implications. Here there necessarily arises a question that is an essential one from the point of view of the approach to the problems considered--that is, the question of "Negritude."

In the era of African independence, various authors, both European and African, stressed the "Negro" or "black" character of sub-Saharan Islam. This outlook corresponded to an orientation that was dominant at that crucial moment in the history of Africa, within both the African and the "white" (European, Arab or "Asiatic") societies or elites. It seems, however, that it was not subjected to objective analysis defining the scope and limits of the phenomenon evoked. In particular, it is based on an apparently disputable reduction of the different manifestations of sub-Saharan Islam to a single model, founded on the emphasizing of some local manifestations extrapolated to the whole. This reductive scheme is often opposed by an ideal model of "white" Moslem practice, to which the practices of the other populations of the Moslem world are likewise reduced somewhat schematically. This scheme needs to be studied more closely, taking into account the differences of behavior that can be noted within the overall

groups thus contrasted. Analysis of the "Negro" foundations of sub-Saharan Islam should be undertaken within the framework of an overall study of popular Islam in the world, in Indonesia and in Iran, in the Soviet Union, in the Maghreb and in Arabia as well as in "black" lands. It is only upon completion of such a study that it will be possible to evaluate the degree of specificity of the local usages.

In another regard, it has been possible to consider Islam as an "anti-Negritude." From this point of view, the contrast between the behavior of the Islamized populations and of those corresponding to the ideal "Negro" model has been stressed: where Islam is established, rhythm, dance, the masks, bodily or affective spontaneity tend to be replaced by another type of behavior marked by moderation, self-control, discipline of body, gesture, mind. In contrast to this observation, the hypothesis has been suggested that the brotherhood practices of Sufi inspiration have precisely made it possible to accomodate the Arab or white Islamic ideal with the "Negro" tendencies. This view needs to be analyzed, here also, within the framework of a general study of the whole of Sufi practices in the Moslem world and of their foundations, before it is systematically related to any African biological or cultural base.

Forming a background to the orientations of the Moslem populations of the entire world there is, finally, the question of the eventual emergence of an Islamic community transcending the local ethnic, regional, cultural or political affiliations. This prospect--rejected by some, dreamed of by others, proclaimed by the most determined--holds the spotlight today. It is not out of the question that it is helping to mold a part of our universe in the coming decades, even in some regions where it seemed out of the question up to now. The example of Iran, the repercussions of which seem to be important to Africa south of the Sahara as well as in the Arab world, is there to caution the researcher to prudence in evaluation of the motivations that guide contemporary societies or that might guide them tomorrow. What we want to point out here is the necessity of not discarding from our analyses data that may have seemed outmoded or belonging to the ideological domain of another era. In particular, it is essential to determine, if possible, the measure of latent mobilizing force that Islam still maintains, beyond the factors that make for division of the Moslems and independently of the factors of mobilization, of a different order, with which it interferes.

The sub-Saharan Moslems presently find themselves between two contradictory attractions, one of which turns them away from their neighbors and promptly integrates them with world Islam as a whole, while the other keeps them in an "insular" posture. In the extreme, the former would tend to make them more Moslems than Africans, and the latter, more Africans than Moslems. In reality, the situations are never so clear-cut--all the more so in that other attractions interfere. In addition, the divisions of the Moslem world--especially its Arab fraction--and their impact on the African reality should be taken into account. The different competing currents among which these states are divided--currents related to world divisions--con-

tribute to the division of the sub-Saharan Moslems. On a less political plane, though, these rivalries help, by their very interplay, to reinforce the impact of the Islamic model, by rallying conservatives and progressives, universalists and nationalists, partisans of a total Islamization of mores and of limitation of the role of Islam to the religious sphere only, and by making strengthened means of Islamization available to all these currents.

We are therefore witnessing today new developments of centuries-old processes of interaction that have already molded a part of African reality and transformed the horizon of many populations south of the Sahara to a considerable extent. One of the most important effects of these processes is perhaps that it has helped to relieve these populations from the confrontation with the West that has been imposed on them since the beginning of European penetration.

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CSO: 4400

GAMBIA, MAURITANIA SIGN FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION TREATY

AB210820 Banjul THE GAMBIA NEWS BULLETIN in English 30 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The Gambia and Mauritania have signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation and issued a joint communique at the end of recent visit to the Gambia of Mauritania's head of state and government, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haydala.

In the nine-point treaty, the two countries have agreed to cooperate especially in the economic, scientific, cultural and technical fields.

The two countries reiterated their determination to contribute to the promotion of world peace and to uphold the principles of peaceful solutions to disputes between African states.

The two parties have by the treaty decided to create a joint ministerial committee to be responsible for the implementation of the present agreement and any other agreement of protocols which may be concluded in accordance with this treaty as well as to elaborate and submit, for the approval of the two governments, proposals aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

The agreement, concluded for an unlimited period, may be terminated by either of the parties upon giving six months' notice.

The contracting parties also reiterated their determination to contribute to the promotion of world peace and to uphold the principles of peaceful solutions to disputes between West African states.

According to the joint communique, President Jawara and Lt Col Haydala reaffirmed their determination to reinforce and further develop the friendship, solidarity and relations of good neighbourliness and cooperation between the two countries.

The two heads of state reaffirmed the unequivocal adherence of their countries to the principles, and practice of positive non-alignment and decided to coordinate their efforts towards the total realisation of the objectives of the movement of non-aligned countries.

Expressing his concern over the Western Sahara conflict, President Jawara supports the "courageous decision" taken by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to withdraw from this fratricidal conflict.

Regarding Southern Africa, the two heads of state hailed the independence of Zimbabwe as the direct outcome of a long and bitter liberation struggle waged by the heroic people of Zimbabwe. They renewed their determination to continue to support the legitimate struggle of liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa to achieve self-determination and independence.

CSO: 4420

BRIEFS

CAPE VERDE-SAO TOME COOPERATION--The main purpose of the visit made for one week to the island of Santiago by a technical mission from the Ministry of Agriculture of the Democratic Republic of S. Tome was to get a close look at the methods used in our country in banana cultivation and in banana processing and packaging for export. The arrival of the techniciana from S. Tome in Cape Verde, to attend seminars, training courses, and advanced courses for example in the fields of irrigation engineering and phytopathology, was viewed with pleasure by both sides during the conversations. This is the second S. Tome mission in the field of agriculture to visit Cape Verde. [Excerpts] [Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 9 Aug 80 p 12] 5058

CSO: 4401

FAPLA, SOUTH AFRICAN, UNITA WAR ACTIVITIES DETAILED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17, 24, 27 Aug 80

[Article by J. Branquinho: "Where the Fire Has Been Lit" Undeclared War in Angola"]

[17 Aug 80, p 4]

> [Text] It was 23 July and the morning was almost over when we at last left Lubango and advanced on the road that would take us to N'Giva, capital of the Angolan Province of Kunene. Ahead of us we had almost 400 kilometers of excellent black-top road--colonialism left Angola a network of good roads linking all provincial capitals in a country quite a bit bigger than Mozambique. Ahead of us also we had one of the preferred targets of the "carcamanos" [lackeys] (term generally used in Angola in referring to the South African soldiers) and, in certain sections, men from the groups of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. This is practically the only land communications link with Kunene, Angola's southernmost province where--according to a battle song of the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola]--"the fire has been lit."

The day before they had told us in Lubango that the situation was more or less normal. But normalcy in vast areas in the southern part of Angola means daily overflights by South African "Mirage" and "Impala" aircraft and frequent air attacks against vehicles and buildings. That evening, Security Minister Kundi Paihama had just arrived from a visit to Kunene and told us that South African aircraft had on that same day flown over an area near where he was and that 2 days earlier a "Scania-Vabis" truck, from the construction and housing ministry and a military vehicle had been destroyed on the Lubango--N'Giva road.

This road is of enormous strategic and economic importance and can arbitrarily be divided into two major segments. In the first one, for a distance of

195 kilometers between Lubango and Cahama, racist aircraft have not yet carried out any attacks although a few months ago "Mirage" aircraft from Namibia bombed the outskirts of the city of Lubango, Angola, fourth-largest, destroying the "Huila Lumber Plant" and killing scores of workers who were buried under the rubble.

Further to the south, in the remaining 200 kilometers from Cahama to N'Giva --and in the 40 kilometers from N'Giva to the border--we can see a whole string of vehicles burned by "rockets" or destroyed by machine guns, along with houses, medical aid stations, and schools reduced to rubble by the bombs.

Threat from UNITA between Xangongo and N'Giva

There is a possibility of an ambush by UNITA groups operating in the area particularly in the last segment, before reaching N'Giva, or departing from Xangongo, in addition to the threat from South African aircraft; these groups are exploiting the proximity of the border and the vast expanse and very low population density of the area.

In spite of that and according to what we were told by FAPLA officers in the area, there have been no operations by the "Kwachas" (name applied to the UNITA men, taken from the slogan of that puppet group "Kwacha Africa, Kwacha Unita"--Africa Awaken! UNITA Awaken!) for quite some time in that segment of the road, although problems arise sometimes in the "quimbos" (small villages) in the interior. When we entered Mongua during our return trip, a FAPLA officer, whom we wanted to interview, had left in pursuit of a group of "kwachas" who had rustled cattle from the local population a few kilometers away.

The Xangongo--N'Giva segment, above all in the last scores of kilometers starting from Mongua, is the only road leading to the capital of Cunene where there is an albeit remote threat of an UNITA ambush, as we were told, not only by military leaders but also by truck drivers and other individuals who frequently take that road. This was also the area in which the South African force, which invaded the southern part of Angola in June, moved.

Outside that zone, there are reports as to UNITA activities on the 40 kilometers of black-top highway between N'Giva and Santa Clara, at the border, particularly in the area of Namacunde. Starting at the end of June, when the invasion ended, the "kwachas" laid two ambushes against vehicles, one of them in the zone of Namacunde, killing some workers, and the other one, further to the north, on the road to Xangongo, against a truck of the ODP (People's Defense Organization); there were no casualties.

According to the commander of the FAPLA brigade in N'Giva, the activities consisted in laying mines in the forest trails leading from the capital of Cunene to the east and west, more or less parallel to the border, to the communities of Neone, Evale, and Mupa.

Main Threat from Air

But the main threat really comes from the air; during the 6 days we were in the southern part of Angola, we learned of six cases of air space violations and two cases of strafing of vehicles in Kunene.

On the 26th, when we were in Cuupanda, less than 20 kilometers north of the border, two "Mirage" aircraft, recognizable by their delta wings, flew at a high altitude toward the interior of the territory and returned less than half an hour later the same way.

As we were told by Lieutenant Colonel Peguetao, commander of the 5th Military Region of Angola, there were 476 Angolan air space violations during the first 6 months of the year in the provinces covered by the 5th Region, that is, Cunene, Huila, Kuando-Kubango, and Mocamedes, in other words, more than two per day. There were also 27 bombing raids and seven strafing of vehicles by aircraft, all on the Lubango--N'Giva road.

There were four operations during which paratroopers were dropped, plus two long-range artillery bombardments and two major attacks involving aircraft and ground forces, including the invasion in June.

In the attacks on vehicles, the most dangerous aircraft are not the well-known "Mirage" aircraft but above all the South African-made "Impala" aircraft. Vitor Rocha, an Angolan militant who accompanied us on our trip to Cunene, told us: "The aircraft usually fly at tree-top level to avoid detection by radar and people in the cars on the roads can spot them only when they are very close. When they strafe or fire 'rockets' ahead, they usually fail on their first run. This is why they come back again and take up position behind the cars [armored cars, tanks?]. The enormous speed of the "Mirage" aircraft means that it takes them longer to come back for another run and if the occupants of the car are alerted, they can have time to get out and run, for a long distance, because they normally burn the car and strafe the forest 500 or 600 meters all around. But if an 'Impala' comes over--a less advanced but more maneuverable aircraft--it may be practically impossible to escape."

Signs of War Everywhere

As we advanced on the road to N'Give, the signs of war became increasingly evident everywhere. Soon after leaving Lubango, we can see the holes in the asphalt made by the mines which the South Africans left during their retreat in 1975; then there are the traffic lights and signs which are pock-marked with bullet holes; and then there is the old man who rides a bicycle with a shotgun on his back and the youngster, almost a Pioneer, who takes the cattle to pasture with a weapon slung across his shoulders.

Starting from Cahama, the destruction is even more visible. A few kilometers to the west, in Ediva, we can see houses which have been completely destroyed and huge craters, made by 1,000-kilogram bombs dropped by "Canberra" bombers.

Further to the south, we come to the inn of Ihambe which was attacked by rockets from a South African "Mirage"; 12 civilians, guests, and two daughters of the establishment's manager, died there. At Mongua the community commissioner's office, the hospital, the school, and the ODP installations are almost completely destroyed. Trucks and cars regularly are found burned and pushed off the shoulders of the road.

Record of an Invasion

This escalation of aggression did not just start in any old way with the June invasion. For more than a year, the number of air space violations, strafings, and bombing raids has been multiplied. Quite a few months before the invasion, South African aircraft, as we said earlier, bombed the outskirts of Lubango and an air-transported force ambushed several civilian vehicles and blew up bridges in Leba, located several scores of kilometers from the capital of Huila, in the direction toward the coast.

The large-scale operation undertaken by the South Africans on 7 June marked the high point of this escalation of aggression and the threat became quite visible not only through the skirmish and sporadic bombing raids but also through total war.

On that day, large South African units, with air support, penetrated into Kunene between [kilometer] markers 22 and 25 and advanced to the north through the forest trails in the region, heading toward N'Giva. But there was no declared offensive against the city where large FAPLA units were stationed. The South African troops first tried to get around N'Giva, advancing to the north along the surrounding trails and, in succession, taking Mulemba, Neone, Mupa, Mongua, Chivembe, and Evale; in the first of these communities they established their CP. During this advance, the invading forces kept leveling the "quimbos" which they found and killed the families who lived in them (so far it has not been possible exactly to determine the total number of civilian dead during that invasion due to the vast area covered; it is calculated that the figure comes to several hundreds). As they advanced, they left UNITA elements in the territory who had accompanied them.

N'Giva almost Surrounded

After the end of this phase, the South African troops completely surrounded N'Giva and were north of the city, on the road leading to Lubango. At that point, on 29 June, a South African column, coming from Evale, and another one coming from the south, from the direction of the capital of Cunene, advanced toward Mongua, 80 kilometers in the country's interior, which the FAPLA however had entered. The ensuing battle resulted in a major victory for the Angolan fighting men (we will cover it later in greater detail in one of the following articles) and marked the end of the invasion: the South Africans regrouped their forces a few kilometers away, protected by very heavy air support; they evacuated their dead and wounded with helicopters and left the territory of Angola.

After the invasion, life returned to vigilant normalcy in Cunene. The people always expect a new attack but the incidents which have taken place since then in the area do not add up to the same intensity as the operation in June and reconstruction continues. The mobilization and commitment of the FAPLA and the population are visible to the visitor. "We can say that here, in Kunene, the people are all with the MPLA," we were told by Provincial Commissioner Ary da Costa. But one FAPLA officer admitted that the "invasion by the lackeys undermined the political situation to a certain point and that intensive work is necessary to normalize it."

Objectives of Aggression

The June invasion certainly is nothing unusual in the light of the development of the domestic situation in Angola and the international context with a view to independence for Namibia. On the one hand, the attack was obviously aimed at destabilizing the political situation and sabotaging economic development; the destruction of bridges and the infrastructure, the persistent attempt to cut traffic on the Lubango--N'Giva road, the only land link to Kunene, are evident proof of this.

Diplomatic observers in Luanda on the other hand tie the invasion in with the political-military offensive unleashed in recent months by the MPLA-Labor Party against UNITA in the country's central provinces, that is, Benguela, Huambo, Bie, and Moxico, going from the coast toward the interior. This offensive, according to official sources, caused the destruction of more than 40 "kwachas" bases and foreign newspapermen, who visited the central part of Angola, confirmed that a very large number of peasants, who had been in the forests in the region, surrendered to the authorities.

With the operational capacity UNITA limited in the center--the area where this group up to a certain point managed to get some kind of hold among the population due to an openly tribalist policy--the offensive might also have been aimed, according to those same observers, at creating conditions for greater effectiveness of UNITA in the south, where it has the benevolent protection of South African aircraft, tanks, and guns.

Finally, the South African operation came during a specific phase of negotiations promoted by the UN with a view to independence for Namibia; these negotiations called for the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the border between Namibia and Angola. Pretoria has already stated that it would like to see UNITA seated at the negotiating table. Angolan Security Minister Kundi Paihama expressed the assumption that the South Africans, through their invasion, wanted to "install UNITA in the province, attack the provincial capital N'Giva, and thus permit the proclamation, by UNITA, of the Black Socialist Republic of Angola."

Perhaps Pretoria's intentions did not go that far. But the entire effort to destablize and isolate Cunene and to turn it into a "stronghold" of Savimbi's puppets is clearly visible.

"Here We Are Brave, Comrade"

But like the Americans in Vietnam, the Rhodesians in Mozambique, the "lackeys" in Angola are running into the determination of a nation. When we left Mongua on 26 July, almost at nightfall, to return to Lubango, a young FAPLA soldier stepped out of his trench, approached our jeep, and asked which one of us was a Mozambican. We identified ourselves. He saluted us with his weapon and said: "Tell them in Mozambique that we are brave here, comrade."

[24 Aug 80, p 4]

> [Text] Almost 2 months have passed since the battle of Mongua which was fought on 29 June between the FAPLA and the South African forces which had invaded the southern part of Angola. Its importance however remains and continues to be quite timely. Like the defeat of the Rhodesians in Mavonde, in Mozambique, and like the failure of South African intervention in Angola itself in 1975, the battle of Mongua will seriously damage the myth of the military invincibility of the racist regimes (or ex-regimes) in that part of Africa. Using a perhaps smaller force, the South Africans in 1975 advanced into Angola more or less the way they wanted to and were stopped only at the gates of Luanda; in June 1980, the FAPLA stopped them 80 kilometers from the border. In 1975, there was a large percentage of Cuban elite soldiers participating in the fighting, along with the intervention of the feared Soviet "BM-21" multiple rocket launcher; the "BM-21" were not in use at Mongua and neither were the Cuban (by the way, we did not see any Cuban soldiers in Kunene). We heard several FAPLA officers say that the "battle of Mongua demonstrated that, in terms of infantry, we have no reason to envy the South Africans; the only problem is aviation." The natural euphoria of victory must not turn into an attitude of overconfidence or underestimation of an extremely dangerous enemy; it is therefore necessary to recognize the importance of that military operation. This is the background for the following chapter, prepared on the basis of surveys and interviews with FAPLA officers and soldiers as well as civilians in Lubango, Cahama, Xangongo, Mongua and N'Giva, whom we wish to thank at this point for the help they gave us.

Early in the afternoon, the situation was calm but tense in Mongua. It was 29 June--more than 20 days after South African forces, estimated at thousands of men and hundreds of armored cars, entered the southern part of Angola with heavy air and artillery support.

These forces spent several days in Mongua. They came from Kuamato, to the southwest, in the direction toward the border, along the trails leading to the sand desert surrounding the capital of the province of Kunene, N'Giva. They continued on to the community of Evale, to the east.

This is where the invading forces penetrated most deeply into the territory of Kunene; it is 80 kilometers, as the crow flies, to the border, a little more by road. It was also here, on that afternoon, that the decisive battle, which would mark the end of the invasion, would be fought.

What Is Mongua?

Located about 50 kilometers north of N'Giva, Mongua--like most of the communities in Kunene--is a small cluster of half a dozen houses whose importance resides more in its location on the Lubango--N Giva road than its role as a population or even commercial center.

It would perhaps be more correct to say that Mongua was a cluster of half a dozen houses. During the fighting on 29 June, practically all houses were hit by South African bombs and most of them--the medical aid station, the school, the community commissioner's office, and the ODP center--were totally or partly destroyed.

The South African forces covered hundreds of kilometers in the interior of Angola, starting on the 7th, moving along trails linking the communities of Kuamato, Neone, Mupa, Mongua, and Evale. They reached a point 23 kilometers north of N'Giva, the provincial capital, although they did not launch a frontal attack against the city.

Shortly before 0300, two South African columns approached from Mongua. One of them, the larger one, came from the east, from Evale, and the other one came from the south, along the N'Giva road.

A Thousand Men and More than a Hundred Armored Vehicles

Altogether, these forces added up to one brigade of motorized infantry plus attached units, in other words, more than 1,000 men, 82 [illegible in original] "AML-90," "AML-60," "Ferret," "Sarracen," and "Alladin" armored cars, with artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.

The FAPLA had entered Mongua a short time earlier. The trenches had yet to be dug and the preparation of defensive positions had not been completed. The numerical disproportion between the forces facing each other--we were told later on by the commander of the 1st Military Region of Angola, Lieutenant Colonel "Poguetao"--was 3:1 in favor of the South Africans.

Warned of the enemy's approach, the FAPLA got ready: one company took up a frontal position, arranging its men in an arc in order to receive the full force of the South African attack. Another two companies occupied trenches slightly to the rear, to the right and left of the first company.

The Angolan troops were also motorized infantry, with some armored vehicles and trucks, equipped with highly accurate "B-10" AT missiles.

The battle began at 1445. Confident in their numerical superiority--although theoretically, a disproportion of 1:3 makes it possible to resist in defense positions--the South African forces moved against the first trenches of the Angolan soldiers.

"It was difficult to count them," the deputy commander of the FAPLA operating in Mongua told us later, "the fire was heavy and there were only 500 meters between us and them. But we managed to hold."

The FAPLA company deployed frontally managed to resist effectively. One after the other, the South African armored vehicles were destroyed by the "B-10" and by the "RPG-7" rockets. A FAPLA truck was hit and set on fire. Infantry casualties amounted to scores on either side.

Relief Column Held up by Aircraft

A FAPLA relief column in the meantime was approaching Mongua, coming from the north.

Its advance however was interrupted by South African aircraft which intercepted the column several kilometers to the north and prevented it from advancing toward the scene of the fighting until it was all over. "If this column had managed to arrive in time," a senior FAPLA officer said, "things would have been quite different."

But the column did not arrive in time and the fighting continued. Failing to break through the FAPLA defenses, the South African groups called for air support which came in the form a two squadrons of "Mirage" aircraft.

The aircraft tried to drop bombs for about half an hour but the AA fire was too heavy; many ground-to-air missiles and AA guns made it entirely too risky for the aircraft to come in low enough to bomb effectively. After some time, the two squadrons were forceed to withdraw.

FAPLA Counteroffensive

"At that point we launched our counteroffensive," we were told by Lieutenant Colonel Foguetao, who, from a CP about 30 kilometers from Mongua, kept track of the fighting. The advance of the "lackeys" had been stopped and they were gradually withdrawing. The comrades in the company that had been holding the line came out of their trenches in pursuit of the enemy and the two companies on either side also advanced and attacked the enemy on the flanks."

"They had not expected that," he continued, "and they ran in panic. We were crossing terrain with the bodies of South Africans and with destroyed armored vehicles."

"Mirage" Aircraft Leave--"Buccaneer" Aircraft Come In

The situation barely changed with the arrival of the "Buccaneer" aircraft. These are strategic aircraft which can bomb effectively from an altitude of 4,000-6,000 meters, beyond the range of AA guns and missiles.

That is what they did at Mongua, dropping scores of bombs which almost completely destroyed the community, setting one of the FAPLA armored vehicles on fire, and forcing the Angolan fighting men to return to the protection of the trenches--not without suffering some dead.

The protection offered by the bombing raid enabled the South Africans to pick up their dead in the field, to recover armored vehicles which had been hit (the tracks left by them in the field are clearly visible in the films made by an Angolan television team which had gone to Mongua shortly after the fighting), and to withdraw. They regrouped their forces about 8 kilometers away and from that point various helicopters made four round-trips to Namibia, transporting the dead and wounded (at this point, on the following day, the FAPLA found blood-soaked wound dressings and other first-aid material). The remaining troops headed for the zone of Kuamato and from there they continued on to the border. The battle of Mongua was over at the end of the afternoon and that also marked the end of the invasion of Angola.

After-Action Report

"There were no dead or injured among the civilian population. The people had been warned of the approach of the 'carcamanos' and had withdrawn to safer areas," we were told by Lieutenant Colonel Foguetao.

"But property damage," he added, "was enormous. Almost all houses in the community had been hit by bombs and many were destroyed. We had dead and wounded among the FAPLA and one armored car and one truck were burned. It is difficult for us to say what the casualties and equipment losses were on the South African side because, as a result of protection provided by the "Buccaneer" aircraft, they were able to withdraw those who were in the field and to recover the armored vehicles. But we do know that many armored vehicles were hit and that their infantry casualties must have at least been as heavy as ours."

From an overall viewpoint, the situation certainly turned out favorable. The "lackeys" spent 22 days in the southern part of Angola but they did not get past Mongua. The biggest military force mobilized by the biggest and best-equipped armed forces on the African continent, since World War II--according to their own officials--was defeated in the only frontal battle on Angolan territory (as for the rest, there were essentially minor skirmishes) which is undoubtedly significant.

[27 Aug 80, p 4]

> [Text] In the old days, the Portuguese colonialists were accustomed to calling this part the end of the world. They sent nothing here, they built nothing; they were only looking for cattle. Kunene was not even a district almost throughout the entire colonial era; it was a township in what at that time was the district and today is the province of Huila. This is what we were told by Ma Ary da Costa, commissioner (governor) of Kunene, Angola's southernmost province, also the province most heavily hit by the South African war of aggression. But Ary da Costa did not only talk to us about war the day after our arrival in the provincial capital. The early morning hours were taken up by a political-military training session for the workers and a visit to N'Giva where the provincial commissioner, with visible pride, showed us what is being built: the sports arena, the development for homeless individuals, etc. After that, in a room of the commissioner's building, he talked to us about "his" Kunene, a province which has practically no economic infrastructure facilities, a province with enormous communications problems, daily threatened by the South African attacks, a province which, in spite of everything, records some of the highest development indexes in all of Angola.

Kunene is a strip of land with an essentially rectangular shape, comparable in size to the province of Tete. Bordered in the west by Mocamedes Atlantico, in the north by Huila, and in the east by Kuando Kubango, it has a border running for several hundred kilometers with occupied Namibia, in the south.

Like almost all Angolan provinces, Kunene is only sparsely populated. The province consists almost completely of vast expanses of sandy land, with a vegetation that is not very dense, where scattered "quimbos" (small villages inhabited by a small number of families) are populated mostly by the Kuanhamas, a tribe of shepherds and warriors who engage almost exclusively in cattle raising.

The capital, N'Giva (formerly Pereira d'Eca), is a small town with about 5,000 inhabitants; by virtue of their cleanliness, its streets contrast with those in other Angolan cities; it has minimum infrastructure facilities, such as a hospital, schools, government agencies, a recently opened athletic field, a motion picture theater which is being rebuilt, etc.

Problem of "Homeless People"

The social situation in the town was up to a certain point disturbed by the influx of several hundred so-called "displaced persons"--these are peasants

who, due to the war, were forced to leave their home territories and seek safety in the city. Although there are not very many of them, their number is sufficient to cause some problems of a social nature--such as supply, etc.--if we consider the dimensions of N'Giva. They have been put up in several scores of straw huts, hastily built to house them; but construction has already been started on a development featuring better homes, consisting of wattle and daub and adobe.

Xangongo (formerly Rocadas) is the province's second-largest urban center; it is located 100 kilometers north of N'Giva and controls the enormous bridge over the Kunene River, the biggest one in Angola.

Biggest Difficulties in Communications

Kunene is cut from north to south by the black-top highway running from Lubango, across the provincial border in the area of Cahama, continuing for 200 kilometers to N'Giva and another 40 kilometers to Namibia. This is the only regular access road leading to Kunene; there are no railroad connections and, for obvious safety reasons, flights by Angolan airlines to N'Giva have not been regular.

More or less parallel to the border, there are also some dirt roads and forest trails linking the townships and communities in the province's interior, where traffic is generally dangerous due to South African aircraft and, in some sections, groups of UNITA.

Forgotten Territory

The "forgetfulness" to which Portuguese colonialism doomed Kunene--a forgetfulness which, according to some militants in N'Giva, sometimes tends to emerge again in some sectors--left a heritage of a situation of extreme economic underdevelopment and [illegible words in original] dependence in relation to the province [illegible words], on all levels.

In terms of industry, for example, Kunene has only a small lumber processing plant in N'Giva and only one brick factory in Xangongo. The province's main resource and perhaps the only significant one is beef cattle whose products are consumed locally and distributed to other Angolan provinces (meat, milk, and butter are components of the basic diet of the Kuanhamas along with a cereal of the "mapira" type, called "massombo").

Almost All Sectors Hit by War

Almost all economic and social sectors of Kunene have to a greater or lesser degree been affected by the wartime situation which the province is experiencing--and this is one of the conclusions that stands out in the extensive interview given by Maj Ary da Costa.

"The racists are trying to turn this part of our land into a no-man's land, a scorched earth. This is why they are bombing the schools, the villages, the fields, and the cattle. They do this to intimidate and threaten the peoples because they unconditionally support our comrades in Namibia. They want to turn this into no-man's land so as to get the people to leave the southern strip and go further into the interior of the territory, creating a buffer zone along the border in order to prevent the moves of the SWAPO."

The Kunene provincial commissioner continued to talk about the situation in some sectors which were particularly hit by South African attacks. "Right now we are having big problems in housing. This is quite understandable because they scorched-earth policy along the border has forced many persons to leave their homes. We have many such people here in the provincial capital and also in the township. For the time being they are not very well settled and we had to do the best we could; but we are building slightly better houses with wattle and daub and mud. We are trying to solve the problem with local materials, using only the resources available in our province."

No Stones for Construction in Kunene

There is a good reason for this remark by Ary da Costa: in practically all of Kunene, there is no suitable stone for construction; it has to be obtained in the zone of Cahana, 200 kilometers north of N'Giva.

Overall, the provincial commissioner noted the existence of "serious housing shortages which we are trying to resolve." The construction industry in turn is facing a tremendous work overload caused by the need for rebuilding installations hit by South African attacks. "But they responded to the challenge," says Ary da Costa, "and they even built some schools and bridges. I must also note the reconstruction of the bridge over the Kunene River which is extremely important to the supply and the entire life of the province; it had been destroyed by the 'lackeys' in 1975."

Next, Ary da Costa talked to us about supplying the population. The provincial domestic trade sector, he says, has been able to do its job in spite of the difficulties on the national level. But two types of problems came up just the same: transportation for the distribution of products (this is also tied in with the military situation) and a problem which he defined as being of a cultural character. "The population of this province essentially lives from meat and that creates certain difficulties. We have made every effort to diversify the diet of the people and to get them accustomed to consuming other products and we have had some success here."

In the South of the Southern Part of Angola

"We are in the southern part of the south of Angola, where we have no railroads, no port, and where goods either come in by aircraft or by truck.

The racists bomb and destroy vehicles and this calls for a rather complicated setup to protect the trucks. Last month alone we had to record the loss of 7 vehicles in our provincial motor pool, and that will give you an idea of the dimensions of the problem," he added, also touching on the question of supplies.

"On the level of transportation, we are still considerably short of the target. We have a serious shortage of spare parts on the provincial level and to get supplies, we must go about 400 kilometers by highway, which presupposes a tremdous wear and tear on the equipment. This is why the lifetime of our vehicles is substantially reduced. Regarding communications likewise, right now telephone links between the provincial capital and the rest of the countryare interrupted, but we are trying to normalize the situation."

The provincial commissioner then briefly touched on the situation in other sectors such as public health (there are seven doctors in the province, four civil service doctors and three private doctors), education and the literacy drive, and sports. On this latter point, Ary da Costa told us about the multipurpose sports facility which will be opened within a few days as part of the ceremonies commemorating the date of 1 August the anniversary of the proclamation of the FAPLA. "This is one of the best, nationwide, with international dimensions. We are also improving the soccer field and the tracks, the hammer-throw, and javelin facilities, etc.," he said.

Water--Another Problem

"We have some problems in getting water. As you know, the province has only one permanent water course, the Junene River. The colonialists did nothing to solve the people's problems in this respect. We are making every effort to open up 'xipacas' [watering holes] to provide water for the cattle and we are also doing some drilling to provide the population with drinking water. But drinking water for the people implies certain support facilities which the province does not have and we are having some difficulties here. These difficulties have been partly resolved and right now we have drinking water in all townships and even in all communities."

"In spite of this wartime situation, we want to provide a minimum of amenities for our people. This is one concern of the central government and the provincial government; we do not want to abandon those population groups," continued Maj Ary da Costa.

The provincial commissioner finally analyzed the situation in terms of the people's political mobilization and the operations of UNITA in the province (at this point, Savimbi was in the midst of a propaganda campaign in Europe, asserting that he controlled vast areas of Kunene).

"Our people is 100 percent behind the activities of the party and the government; the people of Kunene are with the MPLA. We can say generally

that the spirit of the people is very good; the population is ready to participate in the tasks that have been outlined and also to report actions of banditry. You have seen that every member of our people here, on foot, on bicycle, on horseback, or in trucks, is armed to defend himself. Everybody is armed because our people categorically reject the puppets of UNITA and the other counterrevolutionaries who want to entice the population," he said.

UNITA Is Nowhere

"Savimbi," Ary da Costa said, "is using the circumstances created by his own bosses, the South African racists, for his own propaganda. A month ago, in this latest invasion, they occupied certain parts of the province, such as the communities of Xieto, Evale, Neone, and Kuamato. That was utilized--according to the intention of South Africa--to infiltrate groups of bandits and to permit some organization on their part. But UNITA really does not have sufficient strength to do what it says it wants to do. You have been here in N'Giva, you have been in Cahama, in Xangongo, in Mongua, and you were able to see for yourselves: they are few in number and they operate in certain specific spots in the province. They carry out bandit raids; they steal from the people and they rape them, they force them to go with them into the forest. UNITA is nothing here. It has absolutely no expression."

Racists Do Not Want to Learn History's Lesson

Our interview had begun almost an hour before and the officials and functionaries at the provincial commissioner's office had for some time been reminding Ary da Costa that other tasks were awaiting him. He excused himself because he had to leave. But before that, he stated in conclusion: "The racists do not want to learn the lessons of history. The history of Angola, the history of other peoples all over the world. And we have to be patient, we have to teach them. Our people will not withdraw its support for SWAPO and the people of Namibia because of strafings and bombings and ambushes. This is a question of time: the fire will spread there and Namibia will be independent."

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POTENTIAL OF EXISTING, NEW OIL DISCOVERIES SURVEYED

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Apr 80 p 24

[Text] Oil is a basic factor in an economic study of Angola. In 1978 it accounted for 85 percent of the exports and 60 percent of the state resources. Production comes to some 8 million tons of crude oil per year. The figure for 1977 was 8.643 million tons, that for 1978 was 8.198 million tons, and that for 1979 is expected to total 9 million tons, representing an increase of about 10 percent over the preceding year. The Angolan minister of petroleum announced a major increase in production in the years to come as of the end of 1979. Angola should benefit from heavy investments during this period, not only in the realm of research but also in refining and petrochemistry.

Three Main Basins

Offshore of Cabinda, the production of new fields (Takula, Kambala, Liviute) will be added to that of Malongo. In 1983 the total will surpass 150,000 barrels per day. Only a third of the maritime reserves have been explored, and secondary recovery projects using gas injection are planned.

In addition, research on land has revealed a great potential, and numerous countries are interested. The Angolan National Oil Company (SONANGOL) is preparing to begin work.

In the Congo basin, the "bloc 2" maritime deposit being exploited by Texaco is expected to produce 30,000 barrels per day in 1980 and 50,000 barrels per day in 1981. Thanks to the Cuntala, Etele and Essungo fields, production could triple or quadruple in 3 or 4 years. The gas reserves at Lua and Etele are estimated at nearly 200 billion cubic meters.

The Congo basin also has a great potential on land, and, thanks to the secondary recovery work (gas and water injection at Quinguila and water injection at Pangala), the 37,000-barrel-per-day production figure is expected to reach 80,000 in 1980.

The Cuenza basin, the oldest and best-known, produces 10,000 barrels per day. The work projected is designed to maintain this production for 3 or 4 years more.

An Important Discovery

These were the expectations when, in February 1980, the SONANGOL announced the discovery of the largest Angolan deposit, 45 kilometers of the Cabinda coast and about 60 meters in depth, in a concession held by the SONANGOL (51 percent) and the American Gulf Oil company (49 percent). Its exploitation may begin 3 years from now with production in excess of 50,000 barrels per day.

The Angolan minister of petroleum has thus stated that the total production, which will come to 160,000 barrels per day this year, could reach 200,000 barrels per day within 3 years, and that the new deposits as well as the use of the injection procedure could make it possible to double production.

The Angolan Total Oil Company (Total Cap), an affiliate of the CFP [French Petroleum Company], which already has a 17.5-percent share of "bloc 2," where production began early this year, obtained a license in May, according to a production-sharing contract with SONANGOL and Total Cap, covering "bloc 6," approximately 4,800 square kilometers lying offshore from Luanda.

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PIRES: FUNDAMENTALS OF FOREIGN POLICY ARE UNDUTABLE

Praia VOZ DE POVO in Portuguese 9 Aug 80 p 5

[Remarks by Pedro Pires: "Cape Verde Foreign Policy Unalterable"]

[Excerpts] On the commemoration of the 5th anniversary of national independence, Brigade Commander and Prime Minister Pedro Pires held a press conference on 4 July for domestic and foreign mass media.

We must note the number of questions asked by journalists--questions which were promptly considered by the chairman of the CNCV [Cape Verde National Committee?].

Responding to a question from a foreign newsman, Pedro Pires told us:

"Cape Verde's foreign policy is unalterable in terms of its basic foundations and its fundamental thrust. This means that these are principles which we consider sacred and which we do not change. It is clear of course that, if new conditions arise, these new conditions will be properly handled, in other words, we will respond to new phenomena or new problems, but the basic principles are unalterable. There are not and there cannot be any changes here. We are a nonalined country, we are against the existence of foreign bases in our countries, we are for peace, we are for detente, we are for the autonomy of peoples, we are for national independence, we are for progress, we defend the principle of solidarity between peoples, especially the principle of solidarity between African peoples, the principle of solidarity with oppressed peoples. This is why there cannot be any change here. Our policy is the policy of the PAIGC [African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau] and is spelled out in our party charter. It suffices to read the charter in order to see that these fundamental principles are here to stay. We did absolutely not invent anything and we are absolutely not going to change anything. These have been the principles of the party since its founding. Over the next five years, over the next ten years, there may be some changes in style, let us say, because we have already indicated that any basic changes are impossible. Greater dynamism? I believe so! We are a poor country, a dependent country, which needs technical and financial assistance from other countries, a country which needs the solidarity of other peoples;

we are small and we must have a sufficiently dynamic foreign policy. To provide greater dynamism, we need greater resources. As we get greater resources, our foreign policy will take on more dynamism but the principles will be the same, the principles are fundamental."

Zimbabwe Can Be an Interesting Experience

"That brings up an interesting question. Will it indeed be possible in Africa to create a democratic multiracial society? Will Zimbabwe have a broader experience? Could Zimbabwe become an example for South Africa, a real way out of the system of 'apartheid?' This is how we are looking at the situation. We carefully follow events in Zimbabwe. We think that the situation has started rather well and the prospects are interesting. Theoretically this is possible, but that brings up the problem of whether it will be possible in fact. There will certainly be many difficulties; this will be an extremely complex process because it is necessary to keep various interests in mind, such as the interests of the various communities, of the various population groups, and at the same time, it is possible that there may be much pressure from impatient sources and those who do not like to lose their privileges. Zimbabwe is an extremely interesting experience which we would love to see turning out successfully.

"It is clear that this is a long-range situation estimate, made from the outside. We do not have any data on the country; this is a rather long-range view, apart from that process which we would like to see completed."

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BRIEFS

FOREIGN MINISTER TO BRAZIL--Foreign Affairs Minister and President of the People's National Assembly Comrade Abilio Duarte is scheduled to visit the Federated Republic of Brazil for the first time in an official capacity in the middle of October, according to VOZ DI POVO, along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Praia. The visit by the chief diplomat of Cape Verde is being made in response to an invitation from the Brazilian foreign affairs minister and he will be given special attention among political circles in the capital's country. Excellent relations of friendship and cooperation have been maintained from the very first moment between Cape Verde and Brazil; by the way, there are also great affinities between these two countries regarding language, culture, history, and ethnic background. [Exceprts] [Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 26 Aug 80 p 2] 5058

TRADE UNION DELEGATION RETURNS--The Cape Verde labor union organization, which was on official visit to China, returned to the country. The delegation was made up of comrades Afonso Gomes, secretary-general, UNTCV-CS [National Union of Workers of Cape Verde--Central Labor Union Headquarters], and Antonio Sergio Portugues as well as Antonio Filomeno, all of whom are members of the executive secretariat of the National Union of Workers of Cape Verde--Central Labor Union Headquarters. This visit was made in response to an invitation from the Chinese Federation of Labor Unions whose delegation visited Cape Verde between 22 July and 5 August of this year. Talking about cooperation between our organization and China, Comrade Afonso Gomes said that there was an extensive exchange of cultural delegations during his visit, along with assistance for our labor union organization in the matter of sports. During its visit, our labor union delegation visited historical places and some provinces, especially Shanghai and Ranxung [Zhanshung?]. [Excerpts] [Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 26 Aug 80 p 12] 5058

CSO:4401

OUSMAN GAM DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTION TO CONFLICT

Brazzaville LA SEMAINE AFRICAINE in French 21-27 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Albert S. Mianzoukouta: "A Conversation With the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] Mission"]

[Text] Since the start of the battle of Ndjamena in March 1980, and especially since all administrative services have ceased to function in the Chadian capital, the information coming from this part of Africa is always questionable. It cannot be otherwise: Chadian information services have also been completely disorganized by the war.

In a conflict where the most diverse interests overlap, most of the sources of information become envenomed very quickly, making it necessary for newsmen to be cautious... Tired of hearing only the other truth, the FAN of Mr Hissein Habre have sent news missions to certain African governments. On Friday, 8 August 1980, we were visited by a mission led by Mr Ousman Gam, commissioner of information, and included Messrs Abderaman Hamdan and Korom Ahmer, FAN secretary and committee member respectively. We were granted a long interview by this mission, and we are printing the main part of the interview below.

The Ndjamena conflict has lasted 5 months. For 5 months all parties seem to have rejected the idea of having a dialog, and the will and wishes of all Chadian factions are being expressed through the use of arms. An unfortunate paradox: the sound of guns has filled the city of peace. It is in Koumseri, a small town in neighboring Cameroon, that the sons of Chad find a certain amount of peace. Some of the 11 groups in conflict with each other only believe in salvation through arms, others demand a Chadian federation, and it seems that no one wants to take the initiative towards a negotiated solution. Is this the end of the Chadian nation?

Mr Ousman Gam assures us that the FAN do not consider a true dialog between the belligerent parties to be an impossible occurrence. "Many of the factions in the conflict still claim to draw on the ideas of the FROLINAT; this would be a basis for understanding. It is true that the FROLINAT has been broken up, but no one seems to have given up its program. Let our brothers express themselves by this means. Even if they envision a society unlike ours, let them say it." Yet, that is where the shoe pinches in the Chadian conflict: no one has decided to silence the guns and to join in negotiations. Mr Ousman Gam reminds us that for the FAN "the solution to the Chadian problem will be a political one." "The problem for our brothers in the coalition is that they cannot draw back now," states the commissioner of information from Mr Hissein Habre's faction. "They have stated that the solution to our problem will be a military one, and they cannot reverse themselves. However, we in the FAN, would have a frank dialog if this were possible. What we do not want is for Chad to explode. Already at this moment a part of our territory is occupied by Libya.* France is encouraging a certain secession in the South. To all this, we say no!"

However, for a long time the FAN have been accused of violating the Lagos accords, which are considered by the international community to be the only ones that can bring peace to Chad again. To this, Mr Ousman Gam replied that the FAN respect the OAU and the Lagos Agreements. "It is true that they are binding on the 11 signatory parties. However, what is not adequately stressed is that it is also binding on the signatory countries. Yet Libya (a signatory country) continues to train and arm certain groups. That is a violation! France, which colonized Chad for a long time, never found suitable solutions. Now she proposes a certain federalism; this is unacceptable."

The fact is that France is not alone in thinking that federalism is the only system capable of resolving the Chadian problem. Many observers, some of whom are Chadian**, agree. The FAN reject this solution. In the long run federalism will mean the existence of two states: the Moslem north and the Christian and animist south. Those who would be most pleased, according to Mr Ousman Gam, would be France and Libya. The one, Christian, would have contacts with the south, and the other, Moslem, would try to get along with the north. Therefore, interference by others would always be there.

From where then would come a solution to the Chadian problem? Many think that only the OAU could get the Chadian brothers to be more agreeable and understanding. For the moment, the mission of the Inter-African Neutral Force has failed, but behind the scenes at the OAU there is more talk about setting up another neutral force, or, perhaps, to appeal for help

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* Read in LA SEMAIN AFRICAINE No 1391, Thierry Michalon's article: "Towards The Suicide Of The Chadian Nation?"

** Read the article by Bire Titinan: "Only Federalism (To Be Defined) Will Save The Chadian Nation," LA SEMAINE AFRICAINE No 1395.

from the UN peacekeeping troops. The FAN, wary because of an earlier experience last March, demand that the mission of this neutral force be clearly defined from the start. Mr Ousman Gam explained that at the time the Ndjamena war started in March 1980 their proposal that neutral Congolese troops (the only ones who answered the OAU appeal) form a buffer zone between the belligerent parties was rejected by the OAU. This could certainly have prevented the holocaust that followed. The FAN do not want another experience of this kind.

Mr Gam assures us that with regard to territory the FAN would control the whole city of Ndjamena and would be strongly supported by the population. Life is coming back to Ndjamena, though there are still problems with the supply of products for basic needs. The people who took refuge in Kousseri are returning to their homes. The city is coming back to life.

One cannot complain about the diplomatic situation either. Asked about the aid the FAN would get from Egypt and the Sudan, Mr Ousman Gam denied that they had any relations whatever with these countries or with Libya, from whom, however, it is said that they received help: "these are ploys," added Mr Gam. As for Libya, the commissioner of information of the FAN stated that all 11 Chadian factions (including the FAN) had received aid from that country at the time of the great FROLINAT. Mr Gam also denied that the present conflict in Chad is caused by religious differences or that it will lead to the big conflict that will have to erupt between the north and the south: "We do not make such calculations," said Mr Gam. "When we say that we will negotiate, we have no ulterior motives."

As for information on whether Mr Hissein Habre was wounded and is presently being treated in Toulouse, the commissioner of information of the FAN and his compatriots burst out laughing and said that several weeks earlier it was Mr Ousman Gam who was said to have been killed in an ambush in Chad...

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CSO: 4400

ARMORED BULLDOZERS USED IN WAR

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 22 Aug 80 p 16

[Text] Ndjamena--Since 21 March, in Ndjamena, the use of bulldozers armored with reinforced concrete has lent a new twist to battles between Hissein Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and the Chadian president's forces, Goukouni Oueddei.

In fact, since the People's Armed Forces (FAP) of Mr Goukouni used this vehicle for the first time on 9 July against the "Camp of 13 April," which was held by the FAN, offensives have become less frequent, but much bloodier and infinitely more resolute.

On 9 July, confident in their bulldozer, built in 72 days in the Public Works Department garages across from a former French military base, Mr Goukouni's troops attacked by the hundreds against the "Camp of 13 April" in the center of the city. After some unusually violent engagements, the FAP had to withdraw, abandoning about 100 bodies on the field. The bulldozer was trapped in the camp.

On 1 August, Mr Goukouni's forces, supported this time by two other armored bulldozers, launched a general offensive which ended in failure, the death of several dozen combatants and the abandoning of one of the vehicles in the Klemat quarter near the gendarmerie, while the other vehicle escaped after having sustained some damage.

However, although the bulldozers made by Goukouni's partisans had little luck in the field, the ones belonging to Hissein Habre's men, which are only an improved copy of the FAP models, have been especially effective.

Escorted by several dozen fighting men armed with bazookas and automatic weapons, this new type of tank called "Mardai Gismi-Hassan," and made, according to reliable sources, in 34 days at Sabangali (the district where the chief of the FAN lives), operated for 6 hours last Saturday without a hitch, during the FAN offensive.

Nevertheless, the vehicle must still undergo some changes before being returned to service. Among other things, a ventilation system will have to be installed to reduce the heat released into the cab after several volleys have been fired, which almost suffocated its occupants.
9174
CSO: 4400

SURVEY OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ONE YEAR AFTER COUP

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by Pierre Biarnes: "Reconstruction of the Economy Depends Mainly on Aid from Madrid"]

[Text] Malabo--It has been a year since the army overthrew the dictatorial regime of Francisco Macias Nguema on 3 August 1979. Nguema was executed by firing squad on 23 September. Now the Spanish are returning to the country in force at the request of the new head of state, Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Bosogo. The country is divided into two parts: one part is on the mainland; its main city is Bata. The other part is an island, on which the capital of the country, Malabo--formerly Santa Isabel, is located. The Spanish population in both parts of the country fell from more than 10,000 before independence was declared in 1968 to less than 150 on the eve of the coup d'etat; now it has risen to nearly 3,000, of which some 400 are civilian consultants assigned to all ministries. These consultants are generally accompanied by their families. Some 2-3 thousand more Spaniards are expected to come as the economy recovers. Equatorial Guinea has less than 300,000 citizens, nearly 1/4 of whom are still living in exile in neighboring Gabon and Cameroon, and about 10,000, many of whom are managers and skilled workers, are in Spain, where they fled from the dictatorship.

The newcomers' moving into Bata and especially Malabo has caused some delicate problems, because the cities are quite delapidated. Except for villas occupied by a few diplomatic missions, practically all the old European houses have been abandoned. Makeshift solutions have had to be found. The first people to arrive were housed on a cruise ship, the "Ciudad de Pamplona," then aboard the "Bilbao," which is permanently anchored in the port of the capital as a floating hotel. Then three towns of prefabricated housing were thrown up, two in Malabo and one in Bata. Electricity was installed. Food is still imported from Spain, for the most part, but truck farming, small-boat fishing (forbidden under Macias, so opponents could not escape) and small cattle raising are again beginning to supply the markets, and small businesses are started to reopen. The people are benefiting from the gradual restoration of order and from food and health aid from Spain, the EEC, and various UN agencies.

Civil Servants Again Paid

For the first time in 5 years, a budget has been adopted, and civil servants, who had not been paid in a long time, are again regularly receiving their pay, now that they have been counted and given official status. The army and police had become a conglomeration of armed bands living mainly by extortion; they have been reorganized and reequipped with aid from Madrid. Schools are reopening their doors, and hospitals, which had been almost completely abandoned, are again beginning to function. Repairs of roads and city streets have been started. With material and 20 technicians from Spain, radio and television have begun to broadcast again, and EBANO and POTO-POTO, the two small daily papers published before independence, are coming out, the former in Malabo and the latter in Bata. Spanish advisors are busy getting the banking system going again, along with the post office, telecommunications, transportation, etc.

The recovery of cocoa and wood production is the main double objective of the economic policy set by the new leaders and their Spanish advisors.

Before independence, Equatorial Guinea produced, in good years and bad, 40,000 tons of the best cocoa in the world, on the island of Fernando Po. Production had fallen to 5,000 tons, but it is hoped that it will be brought back up to 9,000 tons this year. The former owners have come back to look around, and the authorities have promised to give them back their lands if they invest the money necessary to put them back into shape. But they are hesitant, mainly because the major problem of labor is still unresolved. Workers used to be imported from the Calabar region of Nigeria because the Bubis, the native population of the island, are not very numerous (only about 15,000 people), and they have no farming traditions. However, the Nigerians remember that their citizens were victims of Macias' terror, and they are reticent. In forestry, however, the Pangs of Rio Muni, who are much more numerous than their Bioco compatriots, are quite willing to work in the large, mechanized lumber companies. Thus, the authorities expect that okoume exports will equal in 2 or 3 years at most the 300,000 tons exported at the end of the 1960's.

Also, efforts are being made to recondition the less important plantations of coffee and oil palms, and there is serious hope of inding oil before long, since deposits have been discovered in recent years on the neighboring coasts of Cameroon and Gabon.

The restoration of order and economic recovery should make it possible for the Equatorial Guinean "ekwele" to rejoin the "peseta zone." The ekwele was devalued 100 percent in June, and new paper money is being printed in Madrid. (Since devaluation, 1 ekwele = 0.5 peseta. However, 3 bikweles (the plural of ekwele) are needed to buy 1 peseta.) These measures are already laying the groundwork for recovery, as is the sizeable financial aid that the former colonial power is sending, along with it technical assistance: $44 million in various kinds of credit so far on very advantageous terms, and about $10 million in gifts, which come to a bit more than Fr 220 million.

No Lock-In

On 3 August, the first anniversary of the "golpe de libertad" ["liberty coup"], as the country's new leaders call their takeover, a high thanksgiving mass was held in the Santa Iglesia church (which had been closed under Macias, along with all other Catholic meeting places) on the former Plaza de Espana, near the former governors' palace.

Lt Col Obiang gave a report on the "Supreme Military Council's" first year in power. He spoke on the eve of the anniversary of the coup, at the Marfil theater, the very place where the failed dictator was tried. Several times Lt Col Obiang spoke ringing praises of Spain, which was "the first to respond massively" to the appeal of the Guinean authorities. He also emotionally evoked his deep attachment to "hispanidad" [Spain]. But he also stressed Equatorial Guinea's desire not to let itself be locked into a relationship with the former colonial power, and its firm desire not to be cut off any longer from the rest of Africa, and its desire to develop its cooperation with the greatest possible number of partners. He cited, among others, China, France, the United States, and the EEC.

The Spanish are the first to admit their country's lack of experience in international cooperation and to admit that actions taken jointly with other Western countries will limit their political risks. In this spirit, for example, they seem to have favored recently the idea of an association between ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and Hispanoil to explore for oil along the Rio Muni coasts. Similarly, after several incidents, they have given EEC officials firm assurances, Equatorial Guinea being an associated state, so that Guinea can implement without hindrance a Fr 40-million emergency program that Spain has drawn up for its former colony in the areas of electrical power (total restoration of the Malabo network, which is now out of service), public health, agriculture, fishing, and public works, and a Fr 60-million program as the 5th from the EDF [European Development Fund].

However, instructions from Madrid are not always followed to the letter in Malabo, where some of the citizens take advantage of their positions as monopolists. Educated Equatorial Guineans who had gone into exile under Macias are hesitant to return, despite the repeated appeals of the officials of the new regime, who have emptied the prisons but refuse to authorize political activity. Also, corruption is rife in all sectors because of low salaries. (The minimum Equatorial Guinean salary is set at only 1,700 bikweles, or about Fr 140 a month at the official rate.)

France was the only Western country to keep an ambassador in Equatorial Guinea in the last years of the dictatorship and has so far made little response to the advances of the new leaders. Fewer than 20 French citizens, including diplomats, are living on a permanent but very precarious basis in the country. The financial aid from France that has been announced so far amounts to 110 million thin centimes, most of which is to be used for repairing Malabo's main dock. A mission head for aid and cooperation was recently appointed, and

President Obiang has accepted an invitation to visit Paris in November. It was extended by Mr Martin Kirsch, Elysee advisor for African affairs, who was present at the ceremonies of 3 August.

At the beginning of the year, the heavily one-sided fishing agreements that the Soviets had imposed on Macias without any compensation at all were revoked. Some 50 Soviets are still on the island, and only the Chinese are a serious counterweight to the Spanish presence. They are very much appreciated, as they are everywhere else in Africa, for their efficiency and discretion. Their 200-300 technical assistants are said to have made a no-interest, indefinite-term "loan" of $40 million and to have done some large road-building, hydroelectric, and telecommunications projects. The rebuilt Malabo telephone exchange was dedicated last 3 August by the Chinese postal vice-minister, Mrs Luo Shusen.

Finally, Morocco provided Lt Col Obiang with a hundred men for his personal bodyguard just after his coup d'etat (some cynics say it was a few hours before the coup). These guards had been "lent" to Gabon. This rather special cooperating personnel are conspicuously dressed and seemed ready to pull their guns at any moment during the 3 August ceremonies as they did a strange dance around the head of state and penetrated as far as the choir of the cathedral at the moment of the elevation of the host. In exchange for this assistance, Equatorial Guinea rescinded the gratitude it had expressed to the West Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

8782
CSO: 4400

BONGO WORRIED BY CONSEQUENCES OF OIL PRICE INCREASES

AB181809 Paris AFP in French 1525 GMT 18 Sep 80

[Text] Libreville, 18 Sep (AFP)--President Omar Bongo of Gabon stated on Thursday that the large increases in the price of oil imposed by OPEC could have very serious consequences throughout the world.

I am worried because these increases in the price of oil could provoke unforseeable incidents. We must use our oil for the good of all, not as a weapon that is always being brandished, the Gabonese president, whose country is a member of OPEC, explained.

I shall not hesitate to speak my mind on this issue during the forthcoming summit in Baghdad. We have no right to make other countries suffer or to suffocate the whole world, he asserted in front of a group of French journalists.

However Mr Bongo stressed that the United States is responsible for the recent upswing in the price of oil because of the fall in the dollar's exchange rate, which in turn obliged the OPEC countries to revise their rates.

On the other hand, the Gabonese president expressed his support for the indexing of oil prices if the formula is carefully worked out.

According to him, some OPEC member countries must adopt a more polite approach toward humanity in their speech and attitude and must think more and more of human welfare.

In addition, he expressed his readiness to help other African countries which have no oil--particularly within the scope of OPEC institutions--but explained that since his country also has development problems, he would not always dispose of oil reserves.

We must not be deceived by our oil. Who will help us if we have no more of it? he asked.

Gabon produces about 9 million tons of oil per year and is ranked among the smallest producing countries within OPEC. Her production has been increasing for 2 years in spite of recent discoveries.

CSO: 4400

NEW OIL FINDS PROMISE INCREASED YIELD

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French Apr 80 pp 22-23

[Excerpt] We have seen that production is expected to decline until 1981, but the improvement of recovery techniques makes possible better exploitation of the deposits, and above all the recent discoveries should make it possible to stabilize production.

Positive results, varying in importance, have in fact been obtained by ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] Gabon during last year and the beginning of this one, first of all at sea, at the Ayol Marine drilling site on the Assouka permit, held by Wed Gabon (70 percent) and ELF Gabon (30 percent), near the Grondin field (an initial flow of 172 cubic meters per day was obtained). Production is expected to begin during the first half of 1981. The M'Boumba deposit, to the north, is another minor discovery, this time on land. The second exploratory drilling at the beginning of this year revealed the existence of a number of strata which went unnoted during the earlier drilling, and a development program, limited initially to several wells, was scheduled for the second half of 1980. These results, if confirmed, would make it possible to consider a region half on land and half at sea, in which deposits too small to be put into production separately were discovered in the past, from a new viewpoint.

But it is in the southern part of Gabon, near the boundary with the Congo, along the Mayumba, that the results seem most promising. Deposits have been discovered on the M'Bya and Tchibala permits, and the portions of these deposits held by Gulf have been bought back in full by ELF Gabon. A first stage of development for the M'Bya deposit was scheduled and production has just begun. In addition, an important program this year will focus on the drilling of exploratory wells at the M'Bya and Tchibala deposits. These projects taken together are designed to evaluate, beginning at the end of 1980, the potential reserves and production capacity of a region which is rich in oil but which has difficult exploitation conditions, and as yet insufficient study. It will also make it possible to estimate the investment effort which would have to be made in future years for the development of this entire zone, which would then

constitute a new oil province in Gabon. It should be noted further that at the beginning of this year, ELF Gabon obtained a maritime exploration permit for the southern part of Gabon, near the deposits already discovered, and a second off the coast of Libreville. Finally, the reserves discovered in Baliste Marine and Anguille Sud-Est have in fact been put into production in recent months.

Non-French foreign companies are also active in oil prospecting. In April 1980, 6 such companies signed an exploration agreement involving a maritime permit covering nearly 6,000 square kilometers. They are Acorn Petroleum Gabon (an affiliate of the Nigerian Lawson group), Neste Oy (Finland), OMV (Austria), Murray Oil (Canada), Northern Oil and Gas (Canada), and the Burma Oil Exploration company, which will be the operator.

The creation of the Gabonese National Oil Company (PETROGAB) in 1979 will enable the Gabonese state to participate more actively in oil operations. This should be reflected in the development of new forms of cooperation which will benefit both Gabon and the production companies.

In conclusion, it should be recalled that in 1975 an investment fund was created through the Diversified Investments Deposit (FID), fed by oil income, making it possible thus to contribute in an original and significant fashion to the economic development of the country. The oil companies participate in the formation of this fund by paying yearly up to 10 percent of their tax-exempt turnover: the present rate is about 6 percent. These funds are mainly invested outside the oil sector. At the end of 1979, 15 projects were financed within the framework of the FID, in which the oil companies hold substantial shares. The project of greatest interest to Gabon currently is that of the Gabonese Cellulose Company (SOGACEL). The launching of the work may take place this year, with a more limited capacity than that originally planned.

3157
CSO: 4400

NKRUMAISTS CONGRATULATE TOURE ON FAILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Conakry HOROYA in French 28 Aug 80 pp 1,2

[Item titled "Message from Accra to the Head of State"]

[Excerpts] Excellency,

We, the former members of the entourage of your lamented comrade-in-arms and Osagyefo friend, Dr Kwame N'Krumah, may his soul rest in peace, are writing you to sincerely congratulate you upon your miraculous escape from the cowardly attempt perpetrated against your person.

We cannot feel any less perturbed by this affair than our brothers in the Republic of Guinea. We are one and the same people, among whom we had the gracious opportunity to live, to take up arms and to celebrate victories over a period of 6 years under your inspiring leadership.

As revolutionaries, we are hardly surprised by this recent attempt against your life, for, we have witnessed several recurrences of such dastardly incidents, including the imperialist invasion of Guinea on 22 November 1970.

Nevertheless, we wish to summarize herein our views of this recent attempt against your life, as foreign observers and as a group that has had the honor of residing in your country and of taking up arms against world reactionary elements under the most difficult of circumstances.

In the first place, we do not consider this attempt as something new, but rather as a new phase in the maneuverings being deployed by imperialism with the aim of liquidating your person, following all the humiliating defeats that imperialism has suffered in its effort to restore a neocolonialist regime in the Republic of Guinea.

In our opinion, the attack against your person was an attempt to halt the growing awakening of the African peoples, especially those sharing their borders with the Republic of Guinea.

For, under your leadership, the Republic of Guinea has, beyond any doubt whatever, become the bastion of the African republic; and the forces of imperialism, aided by domestic dissidents, and after having failed in their attempt to recolonize our peoples, seek as a necessity but to liquidate your physical presence, which they consider a "threat" to their neocolonialist objectives.

Lastly and above all, international imperialism and its agents have discovered, unfortunately, that the people of Guinea have succeeded, after long decades, in breaking out of the economic blockade that had been organized against them. And the fundamental element in this economic success has been the economic stability that has permitted of a growing awareness by the people.

Consequently, the imperialists are stopping at nothing in their endeavor to plunge Guinea once again into political chaos by physically eliminating you.

Your Excellency Mr President, we the former members of the entourage of your lamented Osagyefo brother, Dr Kwame N'Krumah, wish, in conclusion, to assure your august person, the Democratic Party of Guinea, and all the people of the Republic of Guinea of our unswerving loyalty, our steadfast backing and our inflexible intent to be at your side the instant you may call upon us.

We remain your comrades-in-arms.

Signed:

A. Mensah, Andrews Kofi Bah, Kofi Aneko and Yakubu Dalinkai

9238
CSO: 4400

WOMEN CENTERS RECEIVE NORTH KOREAN EMBROIDERY TRAINING

Conakry HOROYA in French 17-18 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Amirou Barry]

[Excerpts] Comrade Andree Toure, wife of the head of state, presided, on Saturday morning 16 August at the Cameroun CRPF [Regional Women Promotional Center], the opening of a nationwide specialized training course being given to some 60 women from our 36 Women Promotional Centers installed throughout the national territory.

Among the notables accompanying the wife of the head of state were comrade Jeanne Martin Cisse, member of the BPN [National Political Bureau] and minister of social affairs, members of the URFG [Revolutionary Union of Guinean Women], and other women officials at different echelons of the state political party.

As part of the broadening of militant cooperation ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and our country, this training course, which will last 1 year, will undoubtedly contribute to the occupational qualification and promotion of Guinean women.

As regards the course itself, it is designed to help our women learn machine as well as hand embroidery techniques. Three Korean specialists will dispense the training in these techniques, which our state party plans to popularize through our Women Promotional Centers.

It is pointed out that this course is viewed as one of the many concrete results of Guinean-Korean cooperation, which was further strengthened during the visit made by our head of state, his wife, and a large delegation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea last October. We will report further on this topic at a later date.

9238
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIAN ROAD CONSTRUCTION LOAN--Today 1 July 1980 in Riyadh, a loan agreement was signed between the Saudi Arabian Development Fund and the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea. According to this agreement, the Fund grants a loan of 100 million Saudi riyals, equivalent to around $30,121,000, to contribute to the financing of the Gueckedou-N'Zerekore road project. This project calls for the construction of a 303-kilometer road between the cities of Gueckedou and N'Zerekore. The road will cross the Guinea woodlands zone, thus facilitating the development of the zone and permitting access to the iron ore deposits in Mt Nimba and Mt Simandou. It is pointed out that this road will link N'Zerekore to the capital, Conakry. The overall completion cost of this project is estimated at $81 million. Its completion is scheduled for November 1982. The signature of this agreement is an eloquent translation of the fruitful cooperation that exists between the two friendly nations. This report is being sent from Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 1 July 1980. [Excerpts] [Conakry HOROYA in French 24-25 Jul 80 p 3] 9238

ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WITH PRC--An important protocol was signed yesterday, Wednesday evening, on which economic and technical agreements are to be based, between our country and the PRC [People's Republic of China]. The signing took place in the conference room of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of International Cooperation. Comrade Saikou Barry, minister of banks and insurance, initialed the documents for Guinea. He was accompanied by comrades Seydouba Yattara, Bangaly Dabo and Kemoko Gbemou, respectively principal private secretary, head of the Policy Division, and head of the Agreements Section, all of the Foreign Affairs Department. His Excellency the Ambassador of China, also accompanied by his closest advisers, signed for his government. It is pointed out that these agreements, a product of the sino-Guinean relations entered into at the dawn of our independence, involve a credit, at no interest and with no attached conditions, totaling 50 million people's yuans over the period 1 July 1980 to 30 June 1985. This credit is to cover the major portion of the necessary expenditures accruing to projects covered by previous credits under the economic and technical cooperation agreements signed in Peking and Conakry by the two governments in 1966. [Text] [Article by Amirou Barry] [Conakry HOROYA in French 21 Aug 80 pp 1,3] 9238

CSO: 4400

FIRM CITED AS EXAMPLE OF AID TO NATIONAL ECONOMY

Nairobi TAIFA LEO in Swahili 11 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial: "This is Development"]

[Text] The economic development of a country like Kenya usually depends on various industrial enterprises. Enterprises like these are expected, often, to discover how they will be profitable and to make the country prosperous by also providing more work places for the citizens to help them to improve their standards of living.

But it is surprising that some of those with considerable capital do not appreciate a situation like this. For some people with capital their need usually is personal profit without considering the economy of the country, where instead of seeking means of expanding their business, or establishing new industries, for the benefit of the community, they want only to seek markets for foreign goods.

But also here in the country there are some very few examples of companies like the House of Manji group which appreciates Kenya's economic development.

This company was established during the second world war when its founder, Madatally Manji, purchased for himself a small bakery in Ngara District, Nairobi. At this time some Italian prisoners were in the country, but they lacked the kind of food they were used to. Thus, Madatally took this opportunity to produce this food. Later, he expanded his business and after the war he went to Europe to study how to operate a bakery.

This enabled him to establish an independent in the country and later he joined with other traders and opened the Whitehouse Bakery which was on the road now called Haile Selassie Avenue. By 1949 this bakery was baking 25,000 loaves of bread every day.

During the time of the dangerous situation [presumably Mau Mau revolt], which was propagated by imperialists in the country, when some merchants gave up hope and closed their enterprises, Madatally established the

House of Manji whose success was a good example of industrial development in the country. Apart from baking loaves of bread this company is also producing biscuits and this has been its task since this time.

Now this company has strengthened itself greatly and is using its profit for further development and for expanding its enterprises. Also it has tried to improve agriculture to obtain more wheat, which is being used in loaves of bread and biscuits. This company has helped also to improve the work of producing equipment which is used to load its goods. This is the spirit of economic development which is required in the country. Other companies must try to the extent possible to imitate this good example, because it has the objective of producing stability in the national economy. Now this industry is hiring many citizens and also providing for thousands of citizens their means of subsistence as a result of its work.

But the merchants who do not understand this matter deserve to be criticized for interrupting the development of our economy.

We say bravo to the House of Manji, which the day before yesterday celebrated their 25th year of helping to strengthen Kenya economically.

CSO: 4407

TRAORE INTERVIEWED ON FORTHCOMING PARTY CONGRESS

AB192100 Bamako Domestic Service in French 1500 GMT 19 Sep 80

[Text] Preparations are under way for the extraordinary party congress. It will be recalled that in his Circular No 256, the secretary general requested that all the branches submit to the central executive bureau their proposals for the amendment of the statutes and internal regulations of the electoral code and the constitution by 15 September, the deadline. Four days after the expiration of the deadline, the secretary general of the UDPM [Malian People's Democratic Union], General Moussa Traore, gave an interview to the National Press:

[Begin recording] [Question by unidentified journalist] Mr secretary general, the Malian People's Democratic Union is over 1 year old now. In your opinion, what are the major problems that the party has been confronted with up to this point?

[Answer] I have already pointed out that the UDPM is a young party; it is less than 2 years old. The party, the vehicle for the mobilization of our people, their intellectual capacities and their energies for national reconstruction, after devoting itself to bringing our country back to a normal constitutional life, found itself, as is always the case in the evolution of all political organizations, confronted with some evils that called for caution on our part, namely, the scepticm of some people, the (?assent) of others and the indifference of those who did not believe in it, not to mention the hostility of the enemies of our party. Having become more than a reality, the UDPM, the budding meltingpot and the life forces of the nation, was bound to be the target of criticism. Some of this criticism was constructive, but some, unfortunately, was not well intentioned. It was negative because it only put forward slogans and cliches that did not square with any reality or any truth.

The main difficulty with which the UDPM has been confronted is undeniably the crisis of confidence resulting from what I will call a loss of hope in the future stemming from the bitterness and disappointment left in the trail of the practices of the former regime. To these scars left by the former regime must be added 10 years of political inactivity,

which made the work of mobilization difficult. All these realities led to the decision which you well know, namely, that of holding an extraordinary congress for the purpose of initiating all the necessary corrections that will permit effective mobilization of all the militants and give new impetus to the party. The extraordinary congress will be the occasion for our people to make the UDPM an incomparable tool of development.

[Question] Mr secretary general, will the resolutions which the extraordinary congress may adopt be able to initiate changes in the constitution of Mali and her (future)?

[Answer] All the resolutions adopted by the congress will have executive force. It is certain that the constitution will be revised if the implementation of the resolutions calls for that. This revision will be in conformity with the pertinent provisions of the constitution.

[Question] Mr secretary general, will the amendments to the organic texts of the party which will be adopted by the extraordinary congress bring about important changes in its structures?

[Answer] In the first place your question is a bit [word indistinct] and ambiguous. What do you mean by strctures? Does that mean a change of structure in relation to administrative structures or changes in the authorities? If there must be changes at any level at all, they will not be de facto but rather de jure, in accordance with the prescribed statutory provisions. Moreover, the various circulars addressed to the committees of the subbranches and branches on holding regular general meetings and conferences in order to discuss democratically possible amendments to the statutes and internal regulations of the constitution and the electoral code are quite explicit. The circulars point out the need to search for adequate solutions to the problems that confront the party in accordance with the terms of references given to the central executive bureau by the national council during its ordinary session of 8-12 April 1980. The circulars in question stress the actions to be undertaken to fill in the identified gaps in order to give the statutes and internal regulations of the party more stability and therefore more effectiveness. There is, therefore, no exemption; everything is subject to change. [End recording]

CSO: 4400

MMM HAS REJECTED STALINISM

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 28 Jul 80 pp 5-6

[Interview with Paul Berenger, MMM Reader--date and place not given]

> [Text] What is the direction in which the MMM is evolving? This question, as has been seen, is assuredly one which has aroused considerable interest. A change in tactics or in depth? Opinions vary. Furthermore the question will come up again in a few weeks, this time at a meeting of the party's regional delegates.
>
> What has changed? What has not? To find out more, the MAURICIEN chose to interview Mr Paul Berenger once again, first about his own ideological choices, those of his party, and about other aspects of the policy of a possible MMM government. For two hours on Thursday Mr Berenger received our chief editor, Lindsay Riviere, and Alain Gordon-Gentil. Here are the main points of this talk, which we are publishing in two sections.

[Question] Paul Berenger, quite a bit of confusion surrounds the current debate with respect to the orientation of the MMM. This confusion stems, in a large measure, from the fact that the MMM wants to be, on the one hand, the meeting place of often very different ideological tendencies, and, on the other hand, a political current different from what is found elsewhere, and therefore not subject to easy categorizations. We will come back to this in detail, but what interests us at the outset of this conversation is your personal evolution which we believe is a determining factor in the general evolution of the MMM. It has been said of you, even in our own columns, that you are an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. We think that you have, from the beginning, been a leftist in the very exact sense of the term. And besides, you defended leftism in 1975, after having stated that Mauritius "will be the first country where leftism will find itself in power" legally. So, are you an orthodox Marxist-Leninist, a neo-Marxist which realities cause to evolve, a leftist who is losing his illusions, or just simply an opportunist?

[Answer] I will remind you, first of all, that as the leader of the MMM I have not been the general secretary all the while since 1969. I feel that I am the one who is in the least favorable position to talk about myself, about my evolution. I leave to others the job of evaluating my personal evolution since 1968-1969. What I can say is that in my personal life there is one thing that I consider absolutely basic: an incessant quest for lucidity. This requirement for lucidity carried as far as possible, just as much where international politics are concerned as where political theories are concerned or where my personal life itself is concerned, guides me in everything that I do. At the same time I force myself to take a good dose of humor regarding life in general, in spite of all that is tragic and unbearable about it. And in particular I make an effort to be myself, to discover all aspects of myself. That enables me to understand how, despite the fact that I believe deeply in some things, I keep a distance with respect to those things, which is explainable through the lucidity that I am talking about and that I demand of myself.

I said so at the conference the other day, and since you ask me to talk about myself--which I do not like to do--I will tell you that we are, I am, a child of May 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet tanks. I feel that that makes it possible to place me. May 1968, I specify, added to that invasion of Czechslovakia, that was the birth point of a new socialism in life, in creativity, in spontaneity, in laughter, in joy, but also, as I was saying a while ago, in lucidity, above all in face of the Eastern bloc.

Lucidity in face of the American role in Viet Nam and elsewhere had preceded by some months, if not by some years, that lucidity which the invasion of Czechoslovakia imposed on all of us young socialists in May 1968. I was in Paris in May 1968, and that certainly and deeply left its mark on me. I remind you that one of the first political demonstrations of an international nature in Mauritius was organized by my friends and me in May 1968, when, near the Rose-Hill statium, we, youngsters that we were, waved placards of two kinds: one denouncing the aggression of the Americans in Viet Nam and demanding their withdrawal, and the other denouncing the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union.

[Question] How did you take the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia? As a betrayal?

[Answer] No, not only as a betrayal. But as the coronation of betrayal. There is a fundamental difference. I will say that we did not discover anything, we of May 1968, about the nature of the Soviet regime. There were others before us. I can quote a list of men who died for having understood the USSR before we did. Men who spent time in prison, who died and who were deported well before the children of 1968, and who therefore had discovered the truth about the USSR. That is why I will say that it was rather the coronation of betrayal.

[Question] May 1968, that is the big leftist holiday!

[Answer] That is where I am not especially fond of labels. That is what upset Herve Masson at the time when I came on with a heavy dose of leftist provocation (as I very often do in my statements) to get certain people all riled up, beginning with the Soviets. If you call being leftist all the socialists who turn away from the Eastern model, and who want (especially since May 1968) throughout the world, in the third world, in France, in Spain, in Italy and elsewhere, to invent a new way towards socialism, that way which we call "self-managing socialism," then yes, I am a leftist! But if you mean by "leftist" somebody who is always skidding off base, always dreaming, then no, definitely not!

[Question] Leftism is above all characterized by emphasis on spontaneity, decentralization.

[Answer] That is where I am a leftist!

[Question] And what remains of all that after eleven years?

[Answer] Everything, but also everything remains to be done. And, wanted or not, it is getting done throughout the world. Socialism of this type is developing, is taking root, is preparing the future.

[Question] How do you live as in 68?

[Answer] Not, in any case, within the framework of a party. But rather in the outburst of life which takes everything in its wake, including the parties that were in deep in the current of 1968. The SP was on the sideline and it got carried away by this current, and today it still is, more than ever. Moreover, that, while on the subject, is the importance of May 1968 for France, for the socialist parties. As for me, I went through May 1968 like the consecration of everything that I had discovered throughout the months, the years which had preceded, and which therefore had produced an awareness, especially regarding the peoples of the East.

[Question] How does a leftist look at the Marxist-Leninists of the Soviet Union?

[Answer] You are using the Marxist-Leninist label in a way that could get you into serious trouble with the Soviets because the Soviets swear by orthodox Marxism, whereas traditionally they reserve the term, Marxist-Leninist, for the ex-Maoists. Figure out where you stand in the middle of all that now that China has moved ahead by several steps, after a big swing in you know what direction. The distinction has to be made between those who still cling to "orthodox socialism" as it still lives, or rather as it is surviving in the East, and those who want to go by a "self-managing socialism" with all sorts of shades of meaning, which is what I myself go by. This distinction is basic, not only in terms of approach and of ideology, of ideological thought, but also in terms of political practice. It is this attitude regarding Soviet Marxism, Soviet "communism," that is

currently raising a lot of problems for the left in France, in Spain, in Portugal, in the entire world.

[Question] At the Hall movie theater on Sunday you were talking about a "break" with that kind of Marxism.

[Answer] I was indeed provoking several times! I had quoted Rocard. I quote him to you again from a page in a small book that is worth reading: "What is Social Democracy?" with a number of socialist French authors. Rocard writes that "when we talk about socialism, about a double bypassing of Stalinism and social democracy, it is probably necessary for us to avoid confusion. In face of Stalinism, of the totalitarian fact, it is not possible to reason in terms of bypassing, but rather of breaking completely. Our divergence with social democracy, whatever it may be, cannot have the same meaning as the one which makes us object to Stalinism." We took up that difference again to show clearly that for us, the MMM, it is a matter of our leaning on what already exists to perfect democracy, therefore to get beyond social democracy, the more or less wobbly parliamentary democracy which exists but all the same contains the seeds, the elements of democracy, whereas, as Rocard says, in face of the totalitarian bloc of the East, it is no longer possible to talk about bypassing, the talk has to be about breaking completely. I do not need to remind you that at this very time when the Olympic games are going on, I am more interested in the workers who are struggling in Russia than I am in the intellectuals, even though I do not want to diminish their role in any way. But while the Olympic games are taking place, workers attempting to form unions independent of Soviet power are getting deported, as are feminists, intellectuals, etc. I therefore approve the distinction that Rocard makes between the Stalinist totalitarian bloc that must be bypassed, simply leaving it behind, and social democracy which must be bypassed, making it more democratic and perfecting it.

[Question] You yourself were in Moscow three or four years ago. How did that confirm or change your ideas?

[Answer] In no way. Basically in no way! When you go to Moscow, you do not see much of anything except what the officials are willing to let you see. It is quite possible that the language problem and other reasons have something to do with it when you are an official guest. I have been to Moscow twice. One time there was a lot of snow; so I saw much snow on the corners of the streets. Another time you could see many people on the corners of the streets, and in the streets I did not see many smiles.

The deep-down, fundamental cracks in the Soviet system cannot be seen with the naked eye.

[Question] In 68 you experienced what you call revolutionary romanticism, that is a definite interest in different new experiences, a definite interest in the cultural revolution, in China, in different socialist experiences. Today, 11 years later, how do you look at these different experiences?

[Answer] I do not believe that I ever was, at any time, one of those people who placed all their hopes on Cuba or on the China of that period, and the main current, the majority of May 68, did not swear by such models. To be sure, hope being so necessary to the human animal, many people hoped that hope was continuing to live somewhere and to get nourishment from itself and its accomplishments. But in any case May 68 was not above all a reference to a foreign experience. May 68 was the explosion of life; it was life developing in liberty, in creativity.

We got our inspiration, none the less, not only from May 68, but also, and deeply, from the rise of the third world, from decolonization, etc. So after having spoken about these beginnings, what I should like to add is that during the 10 or 11 years that have followed, as for me, I have forced myself to follow closely in political terms all of the experiences that have developed in other countries, the problems, the successes, with the same lucidity that I was talking about earlier. Thus while it may be that many hopes have been deferred, hope certainly is not dead. The self-managing socialist experience, from my point of view, is functioning everywhere in the world. Whether it is in the Third World, in Western countries, wherever it is, that force of the people at the base shows up everywhere. Therefore I do not think that many failures, many deferred hopes must bring on a disillusionment, a pessimism which I reject.

[Question] In LE MAURICIEN we have put forward a certain number of explanations of your personal evolvement, particularly that starting in 1973 you seem, after a "rethinking," to be correcting all of the general strategy of the MMM, adopting a fixed electoral line which, furthermore, follows a certain democratization of public life after 74, 75, 76. In short, the conditions of a certain traditional democratic game.

[Answer] Very true. Absolutely true! I will not contradict that at all, but I want to take advantage of the opportunity to provide a clarification. It is true that there has been a basic change between the MMM of 68-69 and the one of today. The change must have come about, as far as I can remember, around 1970. In the 68-69 period, where we were concerned, the whole gang was totally rotten. It was necessary to destroy the whole gang and start again from zero. I mean the neocolonial and dictatorial society. I will not forget that at that time we had just gone through some communal scuffles, through the putting off of the general elections, the betrayal coalition. Our personal convictions then were based on direct democracy, which we call self-management. Our convictions were confirmed by Mauritian reality, where neocolonialism reigned, where communal division was tearing the country apart, where democracy was deeply violated with the putting off of elections and the betrayal coalition. But from the outset, I point out to you the clarification that I wanted to make: from the outset, when we brought fully back into question that parliamentary pseudodemocracy that we were talking about (and which at that time was really a parliamentary pseudodemocracy), we were bringing it fully back into question with all the enthusiasm of the young leftists that we were, but we were not bringing the whole shebang into question to submit ourselves

to the East. Not at all! On the contrary, from the time of our first writings, we were bringing everything into question with reference to self-management, to direct democracy, which at that time was immediately to assume an ideal form in Mauritius. I remind you of an example in our first documents: democracy was really supposed to be a pyramid of democratic life. That is village and city councils electing an assembly representative who in turn would elect another executive, with the whole thing being revokable at any time, etc. The mistake was going at top speed in the direction of democracy. Anyhow that scared certain people, and that I can well understand! Finally there was the country's evolution towards the elections of December 76. Whatever anybody says in the end about Ramgoolam--and you know how critical I am regarding Ramgoolam--the country could have and unfortunately still can take an entirely different direction, can take the direction of a real dictatorship. Let at least that be said to the credit of Ramgoolam, who stirred the country up towards the general elections of December 76! Since then in Mauritius a real parliamentary democracy has existed, with its defects, with its limitations, but all the same it exists! which could have not been the case!

[Question] After three years of parliamentarism, do you feel that the present parliamentary framework allows the socialist action that you envisage?

[Answer] I am obliged to come back with all the force of which I am capable to an absolutely total commitment on our part. That is to say, to go all the way to the general elections in a fully legal way, to rise to power only through legal channels; once in power strictly to respect legality and the constitution (naturally with leeway to amend it by virtue of the written clauses already in the constitution, etc); therefore, to govern in a strictly legal framework, in respect for liberties, in pluralism, and to respect even more fundamentally the possibility of rotation in power.

That is to say, we commit ourselves absolutely formally to coming back in front of the population five years later and saying: "Here is what we promised to do; here is what we have succeeded in doing, taking into account the majority from which we benefitted, and here is what we are proposing to you to do during the next five years; it is up to you to choose." This commitment is absolutely total, and thus it is in this sense that we respect the existing parliamentary institution, on the off chance of having to make some adjustments to make it more democratic.

[Question] Today if you had the possibility of spending a day with one of several politicians of international status to discuss socialism and the world's future, which one or which ones would you choose?

[Answer] I already regularly have the opportunity, and I shall again have the opportunity, to have discussions with country leaders whom I consider to be of very, very high stature, like Ratsiraka or Reno. I consider myself today as a personal friend of Ratsiraka's, and naturally we talk over

the current situation of the world, the world's survival, the world's future, etc. Apart from that I never miss an opportunity to meet all politicians, wherever they come from.

To talk about the world, we Mauritians, who are of the third world, to talk about the major problems and finally the world's survival, to talk about the North-South dialogue and conflict, about the future of the third world, about international chaos, about South Africa, about the Middle East, about the militarisation of the Indian Ocean, it is much more stimulating, interesting, enriching to have discussions with Ratsiraka, Kenn, Ms Gandhi, with President Nyerere and what have you! That is why I recently let it be understood that the MMM has decided fundamentally in favor of a Mauritian way toward socialism, which will get its inspirations from the successes as well as from the mistakes of other countries, including those of the third world.

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ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF CHANGES IN MMM POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 8 Aug 80 pp 5-6

[Text] In a long interview granted to LE MAURICIEN the secretary general of the MMM plunges into a new attempt to explain the positions that he has taken, and does so between an ideological convention and an assembly of the regional delegates of the party on the same topic. The remarks made during this interview, alas! only add to the impression of general confusion which the MMM produces, and do not convince anybody.

For ten years the MMM has mobilized debate and occupied ideological grounds, insuring the indoctrination of its basic militants in cells in the manner of a traditional communist party, steeping them in class struggle ideas and in the proletariat's vanguard role.

Today the secretary general of the MMM makes one think of a high priest breaking his idols and their altars. What makes Mr Berenger burn today what he worshiped yesterday? Essentially two things.

The MMM filled its tank on the extreme left while leading the MMMSP; the other small groups, such as MCPS, automatically aline themselves according to the positions taken by the big brother party.

The party functions admirably on the Stalinian principle of democratic centralism. The MMM is again a unanimous party. (Oh, Bizlall! Oh, Virah Sawmy!) The general secretary's theses take the place of thought; the general secretary pompously proclaims: "I am the thought of the left."

The result of all this is that the MMM's "hinterland," its hunting ground, is henceforth located on its right and includes the non-Marxist left, left center and all of the progress democrats.

Holding forth with a speech that does not correspond to its political thought, the MMM is living through an identity crisis; hence incoherence and contradictions.

It is a good thing to clarify the MRAM's stance, starting with basic principles.

I. Marxism

Perhaps not everybody is a Marxist encyclopedia. But everybody knows that Marxism presents itself first of all as a concept of the world and a doctrine aimed at transforming the world.

R. F. Calvez in "Karl Marx's Thought" describes it as "a complete system of man, nature and history."

Marxism comprises a philosophy which is dialectical materialism, a theory of history which is historical materialism, an economic theory and a policy.

Of course, neither Marx nor Ingels described Marxism in four distinct phases: philosophy, history, economics and politics, and this partitioning is artificial.

Thus the Marxist theory of economics cannot be studied without letting loose the conclusions which interest the proletariate: that is to say economics flow into politics.

It is this economic-political dimension which quite obviously comes under this debate.

It is this reference to Marxist economics which the general secretary of the MRAM withdraws in his concern about being reassuring at all costs.

What does the MRAM choose to put us on the wrong track? The label, leftist!

II. Leftism

Mr Berenger's interlocutors declare to him right off, starting with their first question: "We believe that you have been, since the beginning, 'leftist' in the very precise sense of the word." A loaded question par excellence, for there is nothing more imprecise than leftism.

Leftism includes the Maoists just as much as it does the Trotskyists, the Leninists, the anarchists, the independents, and many other noncatalogued sensitivites.

The general secretary of the MRAM ascribes a leftist image to himself by affirming that he is "a child of May 1968. One of the main slogans of May 1968 was: "It is forbidden to forbid." However seductive this phrase may seem, in the dimensions which it attempt to give to the idea of Liberty, there is no way to avoid discovering an anarchist ferment in it. For such a philosophy runs down all principles of social organization and living in society.

It brings into question authority within the family, discipline at school, hierarchy at work, and religious prohibitings and taboos.

The arguments of alienation through family, school, work and religion of those who want to cancel out everything are well known.

It can be said of May 1968 that it was nothing but an "epiphenomenon," as Georges Pompidou wrote ("The Gordian Knot") or, as Maurice Clavel put it, that it was a "cultural earthquake." Leftism includes as much as anybody could want in the way of sensitivity, spiritual states, ways of life, exacerbated libidos, anomy; everything except an economic framework. Now, that is exactly the essence of the debate for a country in the process of development. Economics for the leftist is contained in the May 1968 slogan: "Property is theft."

It is unknown whether the general secretary of the MMM is being cynical or provoking when he affirms that he is in favor "of a new socialism in life, in creativity, in spontaneity, in laughter, in joy," when the recent events of August 1979, among others, are recalled. Bergson must have overlooked some of the mechanisms of laughter and joy.

III. The Impossible Synthesis

The MMM advocates self-managing socialism as a "model of socialism in the process of developing, in the process of taking root, in the process of preparing the future," claiming to bring about in that way a synthesis between socialism of Marxist inspiration and self-managing of libertarian or leftist inspiration.

Now, that is the MMM's dangerous illusion.

Let us quote Mr Pierre Livet and Mr Andre Oraison in their study on the MMM which appeared in the "Almanac of the Countries of the Indian Ocean" (p 91).

Talk about Utopia. Mauritius is still an underdeveloped country concerning which it can be affirmed that it has no room for "libertarian socialism," mastery of which the West has not even succeeded in insuring, inasmuch as the Chilean experience tends, on the contrary, to prove that synthesis is difficult--or indeed impossible--between pure Marxism and humanist socialism.

It can likewise be said that the act of setting up rigorous procedures of semidirect democracy and preaching total self-managing can only lead to dangerous overflowings through the base. And it might be added that the "human dimension" of Mauritius undoubtedly is not altogether unrelated to the blossoming out of a certain amount of Rousseau-like daydreaming."

The MMM's "self-managing socialism" is not a dialectical synthesis, but simply an antithetical formula, simply a contrast of opposites which do not make each other fertile.

On the practical level, the only known examples of attempts to achieve a socialism approaching the MMM's arguments, the Ujamaas' Tanzania and Algeria, and the leaders of these countries are having second thoughts about their illusions.

And so, the affirmation of the general secretary of the MMM, "The socialist self-managing experiment, to my way of thinking, is functioning throughout the world," is not only erroneous; it reveals the ingenuousness and irresponsibility of the statements of a political figure due, in some people's eyes, to rise to power.

IV. Being or Appearing

From this fundamental difficulty of "reconciling the irreconcilable" come all of the incoherences of the MMM's political thought. The spoken words do not correspond to reality any longer. There is complete imbalance between remarks and facts.

Thus, with respect to the very identity of the MMM, Mr Livet and Mr Oraison write: (p 51) "As Herve Masson wrote, one of the ideologists of the movement, the MMM is more a front than a party. In it can be found Marxist-Leninists, orthodox Leninists, libertarian Marxists, just plain libertarians and others whose ideology remains unclear."

Lindsay Riviere speaks of a "melting pot" which "strikes a balance in the reflection of the various components of the party, the traditional ideological references (Marxism, third-worldism, ecologists, leftists)." The general secretary approves: "The MMM is, in fact, a front. It always was, and it still is."

But what is the cement that holds this mosaic together?

Let us quote Mr Livet and Mr Oraison in their study of the MMM (P 58): "It is obvious that a single and unique cement solidly links all of these tendencies: class struggle. For the MMM that is a constant which is beyond questioning and which constitutes the very foundation of its policy.

There is nothing more fundamentally Marxist than class struggle." The general secretary of the MMM goes further: (LE MAURICIEN 29 Jul 1980): "What keeps us united in the MMM is above all our party's constitution. Chapter I of our constitution contains all of the essential references, that is our sources of ideological inspiration, the model of the society that we want to build."

On this subject, let us refer to the comments of Mr Livet and Mr Oraison (p 52): "On the level of general principles, the Mauritian Militant Movement advocates a total break with capitalism; it has no intention whatever of being content to manage it."

And further on (p 53):

"In economy matters, the MRM foresees the setting up of an effective planning service enabling the state to keep its hands on the levers of the economy" and also (p 53): "Nationalizations represent another of the major objectives of the MRM, fitting quite well into the global framework of class struggle."

Break with capitalism, collective appropriation of means of production, class struggle, these are fundamentally and essentially Marxist themes. Why does the MRM refuse to acknowledge its Marxist inspiration? We have had an opportunity to bring to light the tactical reason behind this measure. When today, through the mouth of its general secretary, the MRM upholds talk (reformist) which does not correspond to its nature (Marxist), the conclusion to be reached is an identity crisis or a disguise.

For us there is not the slightest doubt that nature comes out on top and the talk is circumstantial. By wanting to appear to be something that it is not, the MRM is behaving like a political transvestite.

Incoherences and Contradictions

Out of this identity crisis of the MRM, this voluntary refusal to assume its own nature, flows a series of incoherences and contradictions.

1. Political Economy

Through a bewildering acrobatic feat the MRM went from a "break with capitalism" linked to a "search for a new socialism" to a "break with Stalinism" and "a perfecting of social democracy," the latter being the basic attainment.

We quote the general secretary of the MRM (LE MAURICIEN of Monday 28 July 1980): "In face of Stalinism, of the totalitarian fact, it is not possible to reason in terms of bypassing, but rather of breaking completely."

"Our divergence with social democracy, whatever it may be, cannot have the same meaning as the one which makes us object to Stalinism."

And further on:

"...social democracy which must be bypassed, making it more democratic and perfecting it."

When it is known that social democracy's ambition is to reform capitalism, you can see just how far you are from the "break with capitalism" which is a part of the MRM's manifesto itself, and to which the MRM says it is still attached.

It is also important to note that the general secretary of the MRCM wants to put in a good word for Jean Ellenstein's argument to the effect that Stalinism (the totalitarian fact) is a historical perversion of Marxism, whereas for Bernard-Henri Levy ("Barbary with a Human Face") or Andre Glucksmann ("The Cook and the Maneater, the Master Thinkers") Marxism carries within itself totalitarian poison.

2. Nationalization-Conversion to State Control

The general secretary of the MRCM states that MRCM nationalizations "will not be nationalizations-conversions to state control" to the extent that the management of current business will be left up to the employees. It is hard to see how the state, holding the capital and controlling by means of rigid planning production, investments and self-management, can bring about a certain flexibility. And there is no need to specify that all that does not evolve as market economy.

3. Attitude Regarding Soviet Imperialism

As Proof of his "lucidity" regarding the Soviet regime, the general secretary of the MRCM mentions the demonstration organized in 1968 against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But in 1980 the MRCM was curiously absent from the demonstration in front of the Soviet embassy against intervention in Afghanistan. And further still today, while Afghan resistance is being bombarded continually and Afghan villages are being wiped off of the map by the Soviet offensive, the MRCM keeps quiet even as it devotes all its efforts to arguing against the means of defense which the West is setting up in the Indian Ocean.

4. Economic Management

The MRCM is changing its economic options upon discovering in 1980--hold tight!--the techniques of administration, budgetary mechanisms, financial control, management methods accounting analysis, and naively admits its amazement. On reflecting that all that constitutes the daily intake of the merest student of economics, one truly wonders how much weight can be given to the competence of the MRCM's leaders and to the seriousness of their analysis.

That is what is known as training on the spot...and late in the day!

The Archipelago

We shall not do the general secretary of the MRCM the injustice of believing that--as Monsieur Jourdain did with prose--he practices Marxism-Leninism without knowing it.

The play that is being performed right in front of our eyes is not "Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme"; it is "Tartuffe."

An objective analysis of the argument maintained today by the general secretary of the MDM fully demonstrates that there is a flagrant contradiction between the MDM's innermost thoughts and its rhetoric.

In case of an ultimate rise to power by the MDM, considering the lack of seriousness in its analyses, its incoherences and its contradictions, and the fragility of its economic theses, nothing in the country's situation will change--particularly the economic situation.

Indeed, everything is certainly bought to get worse when the parade of nationalization-state control measures starts to be applied.

There will then be, quite naturally, a bringing back into question by the population, of the MDM's competence and its ability to manage. Which will be interpreted by our master thinkers as "reactionary maneuvers," "rightist plots," or "attempts at destabilization."

And the result will be the well-known procession of controls, restrictions, constraints and coercion with the mobilization of the base and getting or not getting the aid of foreign troops.

Then our island will have become an Archipelago.

Democrate

9498
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ISSUE OF RODRIGUES SECESSION DISCUSSED

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 22 Aug 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Is it necessary to dismember the Mauritian national territory further, after the Chagos Islands and Tromelin?

Yes, says the PMSD [Mauritian Social Democratic Party], if the MMM wins power in Mauritius in the next general elections. "If the people of Rodrigues vote against the MMM and the PMSD elects its two deputies, I would urge secession," the leader of this party, Gaetan Duval, said in effect yesterday in an interview granted to LE MAURICIEN. He went on to say that in his view the MMM is a "communist" party and the people of Rodrigues should not be forced to live under a "communist" regime "if they do not want it." This statement made by Mr Duval yesterday provoked profound indignation in the ranks of the political parties and the government. "Any incitement to Rodrigues to secede, any encouragement of the dismembering of Mauritian territory, any attack on the territorial integrity of the nation under any circumstances and under any political regime whatsoever would be an act of high treason pure and simple," the Labor Party, the MMM and the PSM responded.

We were unable to reach the leader of the Organization of the Rodrigues People (OPR), Serge Clair, by telephone, but it is known that this party does not urge the secession of Rodrigues, but only greater autonomy on the administrative level, with the island remaining within the Mauritian state. The OPR has expressed willingness to work with any government which might win power in Mauritius.

The PMSD is thus the sole party which foresees a possible dismembering of the Mauritian territorial heritage to allow Rodrigues to secede. Even its partner in the coalition, the Labor Party, does not perceive such a possibility if the MMM wins power in Mauritius.

Minister of Education Kheraing Jagatsingh, who is secretary general of the Labor Party, told LE MAURICIEN this morning that he was profoundly indignant on reading Mr Duval's statement yesterday.

"This is a very serious business. It is a question of an anti-national statement on the part of Mr Duval. Personally, I think that there is also here a negation of the parliamentary system and of democracy. I must emphasize that even if the MMM wins power in the coming general elections, I will remain in Mauritius to continue to aid the advance of my country as best I can. I condemn any statement reflecting childishness and lack of political vision. One must not be a coward and seek to flee, for many people have placed their hope in us."

Mr Jagatsingh added forcefully:

"Any incitement to secession, to the dismembering of our territorial heritage, would represent an act of treason which we could not and would not allow. Such irresponsibility is intolerable."

Paul Berenger, secretary general of the MMM, for his part, commented as follows:

"We in the MMM regard this as an extremely serious matter. So serious that we are holding an emergency press conference today to denounce what we believe to be an incitement to the dismembering of the country. For us, to urge secession is the equivalent of an act of high treason. We will today face the individuals affiliated with the PMSD, i.e. Ramgoolam, Boolell, Guimbeau and the others, with their responsibilities. We will also appeal to all the patriots in this country to frustrate any suggestion that a part of our territory secede."

The number-three man in the government, Sir Satcam Boolell, who was also questioned by LE MAURICIEN this morning, was reluctant to comment on Mr Duval's statement straight off. He believes however that the statement is of a very serious nature, but that Rodrigues will not secede. Sir Satcam preferred "not to take seriously" this statement by Mr Gaetan Duval.

In the ranks of the PSM, very keen indignation was also provoked by Mr Duval's "little comment." Mr Kishore Deerpalsingh, speaking on behalf of the party, told LE MAURICIEN this morning that Rodrigues "is an integral part of the national territory on the same basis as any other region in the country, such as Curepipe, Rose-Hill or Vieux Grand Port.

"Thus if we follow the ridiculous reasoning of the PSD leader, we could say that if Curepipe or any other region in the country voted for PMSD deputies in the coming elections, that region should secede from the Mauritian state," Mr Deerpalsingh commented. "In our view in the PSM, any incitement to a part of the national territory to secede would be the equivalent of an act of high treason. The PMSD is a part of the government and as such should not have been the author of any such statement. The PMSD should on the contrary wage a battle to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country under all circumstances. We hope that the Labor

Party, the partner of the PMSD in the coalition, will react energetically to the statements by Mr Duval and will oust the PMSD from the coalition government."

The PSM, Mr Deerpalsingh explained, thinks that "if the Labor Party does not react as it should to the position taken by the PMSD, this would constitute tacit approval of Mr Duval's position.

"What the PSM proposes for Rodrigues," Mr Deerpalsingh went on to say, "is an island council which would have district council status in order to allow the people of Rodrigues to exercise the authority, in full independence, necessary for the administration of their island within the framework of the Mauritian state. Secession is not a solution to the Rodrigues problem."

PMSD leader Gaetan Duval flew to Rodrigues this morning, where he will remain until Sunday. This visit is of a "private" nature, according to those in the entourage of the PMSD leader.

5157
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PSM LEADER CHALLENGES PRIME MINISTER

Port Louis THE NATION in French 11 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Mr Harish Boodhoo, the leader of the PSM, challenged the prime minister again yesterday morning. Responding to Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who had said during a press conference that he was prepared to make Diego Garcia an electoral platform issue in his district, Mr Boodhoo said that if partial elections were reestablished, he was prepared to challenge the prime minister for his seat. The electorate would then have an opportunity to express its view on the secession of Diego Garcia.

Mr Boodhoo emphasized the contradictory statements made by the various spokesmen of the government on this question, arguing that these contradictions illustrate the attitude of the regime.

It was at a regional congress of the PSM in Triolet that Mr Boodhoo took advantage of the opportunity to announce that he had sent petitions to the governor general and the head of the civil service pertaining to the political involvement of a civil servant.

5157
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FIVE CITIES TO HOLD MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Port Louis THE NATION in French 9 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Municipal elections will be held next November in the five cities of the country, to-wit Port Louis, Beau-Bassin/Rose-Hill, Quatre Bornes, Vacoas/Phoenix and Curepipe. This decision was adopted yesterday by the Council of Ministers to put an end to the administrative instability in certain towns since the administrative commissions were appointed last December. The date for the municipal elections will be established later by the electoral commissioner, by decree of the minister of local government.

The last municipal elections in Mauritius were held in April 1977, and they should have been held again last December. However, for financial reasons, the government decided to postpone them, in particular since the country was harshly affected by hurricanes and floods. Meanwhile, the administrative commissions were set up, but the results achieved in municipal administration were not positive.

We should note that the last municipal elections came after the general elections in 1976. But the elections this coming November will be held 13 months prior to the December 1981 popular consultation, barring unforeseen developments.

5157
CSO: 4400

READER COMPLAINS ABOUT SERVICES INEFFICIENCY AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 24 Aug 80 p 30

[Article by Joaquim Luis Madeira, Mexixine, Zambezia: "Some Basic Observations"]

[Excerpts] In the District of Namacurra, Province of Zambezia, there is a political subdivision called Mexixine or Vila Candida, halfway between the district seat and the administrative town of Macuse (Muibo Road) to which it is linked.

Inhabited by several thousand souls, Mexixine during colonial times experienced some of the most revolting expressions of colonialist exploitation, paralleled by the total absence of any benefits.

On the other hand, during colonial times, Mexixine never had a government school, it only had two missionaries; the only hospital (or, rather, first-aid station) was run by the two missionaries who, to tell the truth, got a lot out of it. Supplies were provided by the four private merchants who made every effort to supply their own homes where we had to go to do our purchasing, without any haggling or alternatives; that is where we obtained the daily necessities which we purchased with the miserable few escudos earned in the mines of South Africa which is where we were forced to go because of unemployment; or we had to swap our copra which many times was undervalued.

Today, after the triumph of the armed liberation struggle, in which many of our young people had joined, we are in the 5th year of our independence.

Now what do we find in Mexixine?

In terms of health care, we have gone back to zero. After nationalization, nobody bothered to continue the health care we had been getting. As a result, the most insignificant diseases eventually lead to death.

The well construction drive which the missionaries promoted strongly, lapsed into absolute silence. The initiative involving popular contributions to the construction of a hospital was stopped because the money we got was wasted.

As for our supplies, when the last private shopkeepers left, we were practically on our own.

It suffices to say that the people's stores developed with their own sad history although we never had any of them in Mexixine. As a result, we felt really abandoned, until soap turns to gold, as we say here, even though we did produce much copra loin-cloths are becoming fashionable again, in addition to the indescribable shortage of other daily necessities. Nobody can guarantee us the shipment of our surpluses out of the area, except for some private individuals who have not yet purchased them and who sometimes are victims of reprisals by district officers.

To make the situation worse, there are certain work attitudes or methods (such as we call them) employed by some of our government officials which remind us of colonialism. For them, they prefer to threaten rather than mobilize us.

Their main concern is "to do away with religion in Mexixine" rather than organizing life and seeking prosperity for the people. This is why they prevent the celebration of Christmas by the Christians, in spite of the tolerance permitted. But they are not concerned with the miserable bridges and highways, nor do they encourage popular initiatives--if anything, they do the exact opposite. These officials forget that the fight against obscurantism is an ideological fight which cannot be won with merely administrative measures. They only create fanaticism in response.

But these officials act this way because they are convinced that Mexixine is the land of the backward, where nobody can report them for what they are doing which is why any work method is used and which is why they pick the easiest--threats and even aggression, in summary, prepotence. But they are mistaken and they are wrong. Are they not turning the fruits of liberty into bitterness?

In conclusion I would like to make it clear that, at the point where our people's political and organizational offensive is underway, Popular Vigilance in Mexixine should be denouncing the infiltrators, the incompetents, the negligent individuals, the saboteurs, and the opportunists who, in the name of the offensive, are exploiting the assets of the people in order to take control of them, thus ruining the political content of that offensive.

VACATIONING STUDENTS FROM CUBA DEPLORE LACK OF CONTACT

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Rogerio Sitoi and Francisco Sinela]

[Text] "Emulation is a thermometer that registers each student's capacity for integration into society." That is what our reporters were told by one of the 16 Mozambican students who, along with many others, are studying in Cuba and who have been rewarded for their example and dedication to study with a trip to Mozambique.

On being questioned at the place where they are lodging, they emphasized that as a result of their commitment to all the educational, productive, and other activities that constitute a way of implementing one of the principles of socialist education--that of linking theory with practice--they were rewarded with a visit to their homeland, Mozambique.

Julia Isacio, a seventh-form student, said, "We were not the only ones selected in this campaign. There were others, but they did not come with us simply because of economic difficulties and the lack of transportation."

Concerning the results of their school work, it was concluded that the percentage of those passing was higher than last year. This demonstrates "the correct performance of the teaching personnel and the dedication of the students to the goal of studying more and more in less and less time," Julia Isacio also said. Parallel with that priority activity, the OJM [Mozambique Youth Organization] sponsors sporting and cultural events, principally but not solely in connection with commemorative dates. Sometimes Cuban young people and those from other countries also participate in those events.

How the Present Offensive Was Viewed

They followed closely the offensive underway in our country by reading the newspaper NOTICIAS, the magazine TEMPO, and even the Cuban media. All of it stirs us considerably. To understand it better, sessions were organized for the study of documents concerning it, and this was reflected in the improvement of our organization and in application to our studies in order to

meet the country's needs in a suitable manner." That is what Antonio Bartolomeu, a seventh-form student, speaking in response to questioning by our reporters, wanted to emphasize as the important thing in activity by our students in Cuba.

As another means of implementing some of the directives arising from the offensive, these students gave their attention to beautifying the facilities made available to us by Cuba. Flowers played an important role in this endeavor, with the result that medical clinics and other workplaces now have a better appearance than they had before.

Difficulty in Corresponding With Those at Home

Several difficulties were also mentioned by the group. A' it all of them, however, concerned contact by the students with their home country, relatives, and friends.

The delayed arrival of letters in that country--it takes several months for a letter to reach its destination--makes it difficult for the students to remain in contact with their country, but most serious is the fact that some relatives do not write regularly, and when they do, it is only for the purpose of announcing some misfortune or other.

The sector of the MEC [Ministry of Education and Culture] responsible for our students' stay abroad has emphasized on previous occasions that those young people show concern over the lack of sensitivity revealed by some relatives in not maintaining permanent contact with them. An indirect appeal is therefore being issued once again to all relatives of our young "ambassadors" to maintain permanent contact, something that is essential to their well-being.

We recall that 7,400 students are in that country. They are scattered among four secondary schools made available to Mozambique by the Cuban Government. This is the second visit of this kind. The first took place last year.

[illegible]
[illegible]: 4471

GENERAL STAFF CHIEF ON MILITARY OPERATIONS, MANEUVERS

Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 24 Aug 80 pp 26-29

[Interview with FPLM [Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique] Chief of Staff Sebastiao Marcos Mabote by Arlindo Lopes: "Armed Forces Will always Accomplish Mission"]

[Text] "I would like to underscore the fact that our military maneuvers are being conducted within the context of the political and organizational offensive launched by our party's and government's supreme leadership; the important thing is to follow through on the watchword to "turn the weapons against the domestic enemy"--the forces of reaction who are trying to sabotage our revolution, including the bands armed by imperialism." When FPLM Chief of Staff Sebastiao Marcos Mabote made that statement to me, several days ago, in his office, at GHQ, about a month had passed since, throughout the country, the military operation was announced which finally led to the destruction of the main camp of the counterrevolutionary groups in the zone of Mossurize. In the midst of these military exercises, we asked this high-level leader of the FRELIMO Party and the government to give us a detailed analysis of the operation but the interview had to be postponed due to the situation. But one day, at the Beira airport, we happened to run across the FPLM Chief of Staff after the victory at Sitatonga II and an interview was definitely scheduled for Maputo. In this interview, Sebastiao Mabote draws a picture of the abnormal situation which developed in that frontier area; he analyzed the political-military operation of the FPLM and concluded with the following observation: "The offensive is permanent; we are permanently alert against any aggression. The armed forces will know how to accomplish their mission." Here are the questions and the answers.

[Question] What is the significance of the recent military operation in the frontier area of the province of Manica as far as the FPLM are concerned?

Sebastiao Mabote: First of all, I would like you to know that the military exercises conducted for a period of 2 months first of all had the essential objective of wiping out some armed bands which were operating along the border between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. These elements had infiltrated Mozambique after our independence, especially when we ordered sanctions against the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. These operations were primarily confined to certain areas, along the border, where they were operating for the purpose of destroying certain particularly economic targets in order to hinder the country's economic development.

But the basic point is that this type of military exercise is a general thing for us, in the People's Republic of Mozambique. With or without a physical enemy, we are conducting maneuvers in order to prepare our soldiers, to train our troops to operate in all kinds of terrain.

[Question] What phase is the operation in now?

Sebastiao Mabote: I am not going to say that the operation is still in progress but the exercises are underway now because we are responding to the order issued to the effect that we must participate in the political and organizational offensive now underway in the country. The armed forces participate resolutely, in military and organizational aspects, by supporting the offensive in zones threatened by armed bandits.

[Question] What is the record of this operation so far?

Sebastiao Mabote: General[ly] speaking, what we have accomplished so far is already known to you to a great extent; we have successes, we obtained our objectives almost to the extent of 90 percent. We inflicted more than 1,000 casualties (dead and wounded) upon the enemy; we captured more than 300 armed personnel and miscellaneous military materiel of capitalist origin, as well as many commodities which have been stolen from communal villages and people's stores in the regions of Messurize, Macate, and Espungabera. But we hope to capture even more materiel scattered there.

[Question] What did the reactionary groups do after the operation of the FPLM was launched?

Sebastiao Mabote: We can say that, after we took the main camp in the mountains of Messurize, the situation became stabilized. Our forces are there with all of their firepower and continue to pursue their search and mopping operation aimed at fugitive individuals in order to restore life in the villages and that of course also applies to the political-military aspect in that border region. Right now, you can still see evidence of how an bandit as he engages in some kind of criminal act but most of them have surrendered to our authorities with their own war materiel.

The party and government agencies are doing their job with the support of the armed forces and all of the operations along the border are being conducted briskly. The armed forces have absolute control of the situation.

[Question] Was there any other major military operation after the attack on the main camp of those groups?

Sebastiao Mabote: No, nothing worth reporting after that assault. Some scattered bandits still attempted some isolated operations, without success, such as, for example, a small group which fired at the hydroelectric power station of Revue, where two or three of them were captured later on.

[Question] Did these isolated actions interfer with traffic on National Highway No 1, from Maputo to Beira and Chimoio?

Sebastiao Mabote: There was no enemy action that was really capable of interfering with movement on that highway. Some scattered bandits tried to ambush some trucks but the armed forces went into action and nothing further happened. Here again the armed forces have complete control of the situation.

[Question] Getting back to the main phase of this offensive--the destruction of the camp of the counterrevolutionary groups--what are the factors that contributed to their getting a foothold in this region?

Sebastiao Mabote: There were various factors. First of all, they were able to operate in the mountains of this border zone which are difficult to get at and they found shelter in caves. In this favorable terrain they also had an opportunity to receive outside support by helicopter and aircraft.

The second factor which the enemy exploited was the low political consciousness of the people there. The tactic was to organize certain individuals among the local population who could be used to help them while at the same time this would make it easy for those groups to hide out. There is also one other important aspect to consider: the region is very rich, as you were able to see for yourself, it has various crops, cattle, small animals, much millet and sapira. All of these factors are very important from the logistic viewpoint.

[Question] What kind of activities did these groups conduct in order to persuade the less politically aware elements of the population to join them and how did they get these people to cooperate with them?

Sebastiao Mabote: Imperialism uses various methods to obtain its objectives. But money is one of the most important ones. This is why we saw that many of the armed individuals were persuaded to join with the help of money.

They told them that, if they managed to destroy a truck, they would get 1 contos or $300. They thus were mercenaries since they are also commanded by mercenaries.

Another aspect which they exploit is the lack of knowledge of the national situation and the ambition of certain persons. They tell them: "If you manage to "liberate" 3 kilometers in a certain border area, we will proclaim 'independence.' And one of you might get to be 'president' or commander." Other people they would offer stores and shops inside and outside the country.

Finally we must realize that they force their "soldiers" (we call them bandits because they have no real ideology, they have no cause) to smoke suruma. Now, a person who has been drugged very often does not know what he does; he has no awareness of the horrible crimes he commits.

[Question] During a meeting held in Chimoio, Your Excellency announced that the captured individuals would be returned to productive activities. How is this working out in practice?

Sebastiao Mabote: This mission is being implemented right now with the support of the local structures. Minimum conditions were created to enable them to work, to clear the roads which they themselves had mined and to rebuild bridges. This work is going on normally within the plans that have been drafted.

We are thus reintegrating these individuals who have been deceived and we are thus continuing with the policy of clemency which the Mozambique Liberation Front implemented throughout our armed nation-' liberation struggle. Our job is to reeducate them so that they can serve the country.

As for the social problems of the population, we are tackling them through intensive mobilization so that many persons who have been deceived have now been recovered. The main effort which the party and government agencies are making at this moment is aimed at improving the living conditions of the population groups in the previously hit zones.

[Question] What are the main difficulties encountered during these military maneuvers?

Sebastiao Mabote: There were no major difficulties. Our manpower and material losses did not come up to 1 percent thanks to the excellent planning of Operation "Leopardo" (as we called it) and the way the soldiers performed.

[Question] What was the general performance of the FPLM during this operation when various branches operated in a coordinated manner for the first time?

Sebastiao Mabote: By way of a general and specific critique, I would say this: first of all, from the viewpoint of discipline, in the zones where the operation took place and with relation to the population groups, our forces acted as mobilizers of the population. From the viewpoint of military discipline, they did their job with zeal and this is why they managed successfully to beat the banditry back.

Another important aspect is that, in the course of those maneuvers, we managed to train both the new and the old soldiers--those who participated in the national armed liberation struggle and those repelled the aggression against the People's Republic of Mozambique after the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. All of them got combat experience under difficult conditions. The morale and initiative of ground forces and air unit commanders rose considerably and showed that they are ready to defend the country and to repel any kind of attack no matter where it comes from. The important aspect however is this: in the People's Republic of Mozambique, all of our experienced soldiers are in the thick of the fighting. Now our task is to improve those qualities even more even though we no longer have a physical enemy to confront.

[Question] Finally, what are the action prospects for the immediate future?

Sebastiao Mabote: We must always be vigilant. Imperialism will never stop opposing us; this is the basic point that has to be understood. It will always try to create trouble because that is its nature; Comrade President Samora Machel teaches us that "where there is revolution, there is reaction." This is the class struggle. This is why it is not astonishing to find these bandits. Why are they fighting us? Because we are in the process of making a revolution. But they are doomed to failure.

We will continue to fight them, no matter where they may come from. The Comrade President also teaches us that the political and organizational alternative is permanent. This is why the armed forces will also continue permanently to operate, since all of us have been given the assignment of turning our weapons inside our country, against the domestic enemy.

NEWLY-ESTABLISHED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE GOALS DETAILED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] The bylaws of our country's Chamber of Commerce have now been approved and made public. It has been established that the chief role of that organization has to do with the international market and the world economy. As a result, it has the mission of establishing and developing relations of cooperation with other organizations and institutions for international trade, signing accords, agreements, and contracts with similar organizations abroad, and studying and analyzing the organization and operation of foreign trade in other countries.

Domestically, the Chamber is responsible for providing its members with legal and technical support. That support will extend to operations by the latter in the field of foreign trade and to the training of their cadres. It is also responsible for gathering and publishing, on a periodic basis, information and advertising materials in its area of responsibility. Such materials will make the potentialities and capabilities of the People's Republic of Mozambique [RPM] better known both to visitors and to businessmen.

Also as part of its role within the country, the chamber is to organize receptions for foreign trade delegations, issue certificates of origin for merchandise exported from the RPM as well as any other certificates that may be required in the pursuit of foreign trade, and cooperate in the organization of international fairs and exhibits within the country or abroad when Mozambique takes part in the latter.

As for its makeup, the Chamber of Commerce will have active, honorary, and corresponding members. Its membership is open to enterprises under the Ministry of Foreign Trade or those whose production has to do with foreign trade, international transportation enterprises, insurance companies, and other organizations or institutions connected with foreign trade.

Listed among the rights of the members is that of receiving all possible support in the solution of problems in their area of responsibility and of enjoying priority over other users in utilizing the chamber's services.

In return for those benefits, all active members are required to accept the chamber's bylaws, comply with decisions reached by its governing bodies, and provide all information required by the Office of the Chairman when necessary for correctly carrying out the functions and pursuing the objectives for which the chamber was established.

Corresponding members--whether enterprises, institutions, organizations, or private citizens--will be admitted provided that they agree to cooperate with the chamber in activities within its field. Honorary members may be named when, having rendered service of outstanding usefulness to the performance of the chamber's functions, they are nominated and accepted as such.

The Chamber of Commerce has the following organs: the General Assembly, the Board of Directors, the Office of the Chairman, and the Control Commission. It will have the Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration as an associated body.

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CSO: 4421

PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES HINDER LIMPOPO COMPLEX

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Aug 80 pp 1,4

[Excerpt] Despite its present rate of growth and intensive mechanization (currently 85 percent of the entire production process in ricegrowing), the Limpopo Agroindustrial Complex [CAIL] is not yet producing yields consistent with the investments made there. This is a major problem to be overcome so that CAIL, which is of strategic importance, can develop and contribute to victory over underdevelopment. This question was explicitly discussed in a speech on 18 March by President Samora Machel, who said at the time that the enterprises are not only supposed to produce but also to generate profits so that other sectors can be brought into being and the life of our people improved.

Production at CAIL is increasing steadily, however, and this reveals great effort on the part of certain sectors, but the problem of profitability is far from being solved: many millions in invested meticais are being lost every year.

The material conditions for constantly increasing yields at the complex have already been created, but various limitations exist. The need for further refinement of the production technology, for a more rational use of equipment and other material means, and, above all, the need to keep the irrigation system operational through permanent maintenance are some of the chief limiting factors.

The need to accumulate capital for new investments is one of the main problems being posed at present with respect to CAIL as a state enterprise. The state has bestowed every attention on this enterprise through the application of material, financial, and human means. This is because of its strategic and priority character. As the "future granary of the nation," it has a great responsibility in supplying the country with rice and the city of Maputo with a certain quantity of some garden products.

But the nature of the enterprise itself, the conditions in which it emerged, and the difficulties with technical cadres, combined with soil factors--especially as regards drainage, crop varieties (particularly rice), and the current phase of production technology, among other things--have so far prevented the achievement of yields consistent with the investments made.

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CSO: 4401

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES DEPARTMENT FOUND DEFICIENT

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Aug 80 pp 1,3

[Article by Antonio Matonse]

[Excerpt] Moamba, 12 Aug--The Advisory Council of GODCA (Department for the Organization and Development of Agricultural Cooperatives) met in full session yesterday afternoon. Discussion of the report submitted to the meeting by that department of the Ministry of Agriculture led to the conclusion that the management of GODCA, in the person of its director, Amir Molgy, is incompetent.

Following speeches by several participants, who criticized the report and the work done by the organization in question, Mario da Graca Machungo, minister of planning and agriculture, concluded by saying: "There is absolute incompetence in the management of GODCA, and it is made worse by a lack of conviction concerning the importance of the cooperatives."

According to the minister, the incompetence of GODCA's director "reveals a class attitude" that was manifested in the excessive bureaucratization of that organization at the central level, since only paperwork was being done, with the result that "it has become isolated from the peasants."

Before the minister's speech, and as happened in the case of the provincial GODCA's, several participants criticized the report and the work done by the central GODCA during its 16 months of existence. Luis Pereira, director of the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Office, said, "Despite its being a rendering of accounts, the report limits itself to describing and drawing attention to what has been done." Carvalho Neves, administrator of the BDP [People's Development Bank], added, "It does not succeed in synthesizing what the cooperative movement is today."

It is recalled that this type of report was presented by almost all the provincial GODCA's and that the true situation in the cooperative movement was stressed only by the cooperative members attending the meeting.

The speeches by the delegates to this council meeting also led to the conclusion that the central GODCA, in addition to not having maintained close ties with other Ministry of Agriculture structures involved in the problems of rural development, has shown very little interest in familiarizing itself with the problems of peasants belonging to the cooperatives.

Discussion of Provincial Reports Complete

Yesterday morning saw the conclusion of discussion concerning the reports by Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo provinces. In those discussions, it was revealed that MECANAGRO [expansion unknown] did 50 percent of its work in the cooperatives at the wrong time.

To that and other questions, MECANAGRO's national director responded by saying that its capacity in terms of farm equipment is not adequate at present for meeting the growing demands of the agricultural cooperatives. In addition, priority in the use of farm equipment is given to farms devoted to crops covered by the plan and the programs, with the cooperatives coming in last.

In this connection, Minister Mario Machungo said it was important for the Advisory Council to study mechanisms for making better use of MECANAGRO's current equipment capacity.

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CSO: 4401

BRIEFS

GDR YOUTH BRIGADE--A brigade from the Democratic Youth Federation of the GDR, made up of 14 individuals, spent 3 months doing volunteer work in CAIL (Limpopo Agribusiness Complex) for the purpose of providing support in the training of the workers of that production unit. All of them are specialists in the branches of mechanics, while some of them are engineers from agricultural enterprises in the province of Neubrandenburg, GDR. According to information reaching our editorial office, this is not the first time that this volunteer team has been participating in the rice harvest in an African country. It had done so earlier in Ethiopia. Commenting on the team's participation, the leader said: "We did not come to be work supervisors. Our objective is to make sure that the Mozambican workers will over the next several years be able to handle those harvests by themselves, relying on their own strength. We can say that we are achieving this objective. The mechanics and operators now have a better knowledge to run the harvest combines." [Text] [Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 3 Aug 80 p 2] 5058

PRIZES FOR BEST WORKERS--In the afternoon of the day before yesterday, about 30 workers in seven of the capital's hotel establishments were rewarded for having distinguished themselves in the first Socialist Emulation Campaign in support of the elections in the city of Maputo. The workers were awarded furniture, household electrical appliances, and articles of clothing at various ceremonies held at the Polana and Turismo hotels and at the Hotel Industry Literacy Center, where a party organized by the workers themselves was attended not only by members of the enterprise's management and structures but also by officials from the national headquarters of the Production Councils. At all three places, the prevailing feature was the atmosphere of happiness and satisfaction and the participation of a number of workers, who praised their colleagues for their high level of organization, discipline, punctuality, and diligence, which constitutes an example. As we were told in private by one of those in charge, those parties were a stimulus that others will try to imitate. [Excerpt] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Aug 80 p 2] 11798

CSO: 4401

BRIEFS

SOVIET WEAPONS--SWAPO is strong enough to drive South Africans out of SWA/Namibia without foreign troops, declared SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma last weekend in Copenhagen. "But we need weapons from the Soviet Union and from other communist countries. Although we need weapons, the West refuses to support us. Whereas socialist countries, including the USSR, provide us with weapons. We have the right to accept arms from any country whatsoever," emphasized Nujoma. "Therefore we are still far from dependent on that country." African countries can provide SWAPO with advice but "they are not arms manufacturers, and arms are the central issue." Foreign troops are another matter, said Nujoma. "I am not of the opinion that Cuba can afford to be dispatching soldiers to any and every country. We do not require any foreigners for our liberation struggle; we have sufficient people of our own and we are able to keep training more." [Text] [Windhoek ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 8 Sep 80 p 2]

CSO: 4403

MEASURES REGULATING NUMBER, PAY OF CIVIL SERVANTS

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 22 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Abdallah Faye]

[Text] The Ministry of Public Offices, Work and Employment, which manages 57,000 civil servants, costing the state 5 billion francs per month, has a very large role to play in the area of budget savings. It must see that recruiting capabilities are adequate for personnel requirements.

From now on, due to circumstances that will no longer tolerate blind flying and confusion in filling positions, recruiting will be very strictly supervised, after the ministerial departments have calculated their actual personnel requirements.

In addition, recruiting has been frozen to allow for a judicious redistribution of personnel among the different governmental departments. The Ministry of Public Offices, which is supervising this task, is being assisted by the Office of Organization and Methods and by the ministerial departments. Next, the creation of flow charts for the ministries will streamline their organization and will make stricter management of personnel more feasible.

However, the freeze on recruiting does not involve civil servants from professional schools (ENAM, Ecole superieure normale [college of education], etc.), who were already included in the planning when they were admitted to these institutions.

Last year, 2,819 civil service workers were recruited into the civil service ministry, the majority being made up of teachers.

The minister of public offices, work and employment told us that where personnel are concerned, his department has always been very concerned about the problem of retirement among government workers. In fact, several workers were kept on in service past retirement age.

Some took advantage of an extension because they had dependent children, others (Mohammedan judges, jurors) took advantage of a waiver, but a large number of employees who were not in either of these two situations remained in service, because the circulation of payroll statements took too long, or because they were not informed of their retirement privileges.

Therefore, they continued to receive pay to which they were no longer entitled, because their names continued to appear on payroll statements when they should have been deleted, after the order for their departure was issued.

The situation is going to improve soon, because the Ministry of Public Office is proposing to institute an "almost daily" check to find out ahead of time who should be eligible for retirement, so as to be able, within the time allotted, to notify the payroll department, in writing, of any action taken in this area. This will have the advantage of reducing the time required for carrying out the required action.

Already in September, the pay of all government workers over 55 years of age will be suspended. All workers who have reached this limit and who are not entitled to either an extension or a waiver will be asked to stop working after having been paid, for the work done for the government.

For those workers who are on half-pay, or who voluntarily leave their positions, and who continue to receive their wages, the use of an attendance list will make it possible to keep track of these irregularities. By using this attendance list, only active workers--those still working--will be paid.

Moreover, the planned personnel administration information will make it possible to proceed with promotions, appointments, and retirements, on time; which will result in considerable savings for the government.

The measures imposed by the present situation do not, however, lose sight of the problem of employment, which is still a present-day problem in the civil service ministry.

The ministry tends to control employment more and more. And from this point of view, it has turned over all of its authority to the manpower department, which is required to refuse anything to do with personnel recruited without its knowledge from now on.

The employment situation has incited those responsible for the civil service ministry to refuse all unjustified reduction of personnel.

In an effort to protect the employment of citizens, recruiting of emigrants is always strictly regulated. If the emigrant does not have a higher level of education than the Senegalese, says the Minister of Public Offices, Work and Employment, he is served with a rejection notice. In hiring, the priority is reserved for Senegalese graduates, of whom a list is furnished every year to the various ministries and employers, so that they can recruit the graduates according to their requirements.

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CSO: 4400

STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL SERVICE MEASURES ESSENTIAL

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 22 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Cherif Elvalide Seye]

[Text] The situation which prevailed in the Senegalese Ministry of Public Offices and which the government has decided to put an end, was nothing less than anarchy. The working force, some 57,000 civil servants for a country of approximately 5 million inhabitants, is too large. This condition arose from the fact that while the working force was already topheavy at the time of the country's accession to independence, the employees have continued to increase although common sense advised a halt to recruiting.

In fact, the capital of French Western Africa, Dakar, should administer the entire region. Thus, although all of the officials employed in Dakar were not Senegalese, the fact remains that our compatriots make up a huge majority, already too numerous for a single country.

In the absence of strict control, the working force has continued to grow, with the administration becoming the only opportunity for attractive promotion. By means of unfair promotions, many people were recruited with no qualification. Employers even used several employees for the same work instead of just one. The Public Offices, therefore, developed in an ill-considered manner, becoming an enormous, totally disjointed "house" where almost anything was possible: to be paid without having worked, but also to work for many months without being paid due to a very complicated circulation of payroll statements.

Under these conditions, it is obvious that the reorganization being undertaken by the government can only be unreservedly appreciated. Its very character of economic healthfulness makes the strict application of established measures imperative. Everyone must be made aware that these measures, under penalty of their being drained of all substance, must not suffer the slightest delay.

It is from waiver to waiver and from exception to exception that we have arrived at our present unanimously denounced evils.

9174
CSO: 4400

REASONS FOR INCREASE IN TAZARA RATES SET FORTH

Dar es Salaam UHURU in Swahili 12 Sep 80 p 4

[Editorial: "Our Views"]

[Text] The rates of the Freedom Railroad established [between] the city of Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia have been increased. The fare for the transport of passengers has been increased by 20 percent and the rate for the transport of freight has been increased by 10 percent. The new rates will begin to be used on the first day of next month.

The increase in the rates of the Freedom Railroad is a matter which could not be avoided. An organization like the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority [TAZARA] must conduct its work successfully. Conducting its work successfully includes ensuring that it does not incur losses in its operations, as its manager said.

The chief [presumably manager] of TAZARA, Charles Nyirenda, said the day before yesterday [that] the rates and cost of transport on the Freedom Railroad were below the cost of operation by 84 percent. It is obvious that a situation like this needs to be corrected to enable this authority to conduct its work with excellence.

During the 4 years since the Freedom Railroad began operations, its rates have been lower than any other railroad or other means of travel in East and Central Africa.

The TAZARA authority established these low rates because: TAZARA is an agency for serving Tanzania and Zambia and their people and not for accumulating for itself exceedingly large profits by squeezing these people by means of high rates.

But, the situation which existed 4 years ago is not the same as the present situation. The cost of nearly everything has increased and thus the cost of operating the Freedom Railroad has been increased by a large amount. Under conditions like these the directors of TAZARA have no other means than to increase the levels of rates, in order that they may be similar to those imposed by other railroads to control the cost of operations.

We believe that the people in the countries of Zambia and Tanzania will understand without difficulty the good intention of TAZARA in increasing its rates. Thus, as they have done in the past, they will continue to use the Freedom Railroad fully and ensure that the freight to be transported does not diminish.

Along with various steps which are being taken by the managers of TAZARA to correct the state of affairs, of which the increase in rates is one step, it is important not to forget the topic of labor productivity among our brothers who are serving this railroad.

The record so far has been good. [During] the meeting attended by [representatives] of the three countries of Zambia, Tanzania and China, which was held in Lusaka, Zambia recently to seek means of revealing the problems of TAZARA, it was acknowledged that the work of TAZARA was not bad [even] along with the problems which affect the railroad.

Our citizens from Tanzania and Zambia who are using the Freedom Railroad must take this pronouncement not only as praise but make an effort to fulfill their responsibilities with greater excellence for the benefit of our countries. As we expect the customers of TAZARA to understand the good reasons for all the changes which are bieng made by that authority, so we expect the staff of TAZARA to understand that the customers will expect greater efficiency in the transport of passengers and freight in accordance with the changes which are being announced by TAZARA.

CSO: 4407

BRIEFS

HUNGARY'S LOSONCZI VISITS PARK--Arusha--President Pal Losonczi of Hungary and his wife, Mrs Losonczi, were accorded a rousing reception when they arrived at the Manyara National Park to view game animals. Accompanied by the minister for foreign affairs, Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, President Losonczi and his delegation were met at the Manyara airport by the party secretary for Arusha region, Ndugu Pater Siyovelwa, and a large number of residents of Monduli and Mbulu districts. Before heading for Manyara Hotel where the guests will stay, he watched dances by cultural groups and pupils. Tomorrow, the guests will go to the park to view game animals. [Text] [LD201938 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1700 GMT 20 Sep 80 EA]

CSO: 4407

MUGABE BACKS FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN ASSEMBLY CAMPS

LD191020 Salisbury Domestic Service in English 1745 GMT 18 Sep 80 CA

[Text] The prime minister, Comrade Robert Mugabe, says the government is resolved to end the very unfair treatment of freedom fighters suffering in assembly camps. Answering debate in the House of Assembly today on the defense vote he launched out at critics of the plan to move the former liberation forces into urban areas. Comrade Mugabe, who is also minister of defense, said the treatment we have given these freedom fighters so far has been very unfair. Government is resolved therefore to bring an end to the suffering which they have endured all these months that they had been in assembly points.

The prime minister discounted fears that the move of the armed men to the high-density suburb of Chitungwiza and to a similar town in Bulawayo will lead to more violence. He said: The necessary precautions will be taken to ensure that the new situation will not lead to disturbances, and I have asked the Joint Military Command to give me a plan to ensure that they are going to be in full control so that discipline will be maintained.

The prime minister asked if critics of the plan expect the freedom fighters to live permanently in rural areas while members of the former Rhodesian Army remain in comfort in urban barracks. Where do you want these sons of the soil to live? he asked. Permanently in the bush like animals? Comrade Mugabe concluded: We are not going to discriminate against them. They are the instrument which led to the settlement at Lancaster House.

CSO: 4420

BRIEFS

MUGABE REJECTS MILITARY AIRFIELDS--The prime minister today rejected suggestions that Zimbabwe should begin constructing defenses such as military airfields in preparation for war with apartheid-ruled South Africa. The prime minister told the House of Assembly: I do not think our priorities at the present moment allow us to sink funds into a project of this nature. He added: One would want to believe that the Pretoria regime also wants peace and that it will not indulge in aggressive activities against us. [Text] [LD191017 Salisbury Domestic Service in English 1745 GMT 18 Sep 80 CA]

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October 8, 1980

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